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ABSTRACT 
THT POLITICS OF PSYCHIATRIC EXPERIENCE 
 
MAY 2014 
 
SHUKO TAMAO, B.A., HIROSHIMA CITY UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSAHCUSETTS AMHERST 
 
 
Directed by: Professor Robert S. Cox 
 
 
This paper examines the correspondence, manuscripts, and speeches of ex-mental 
patient activists. I obtained much of this material through original archival research. I 
chronicle the activities of the emergent psychiatric survivors movement in the early 
1970’s focusing on the work of the Boston based activist, Judi Chamberlin (1944-2010). 
This paper examines how mental patients in post-war America, specifically between the 
1950’s and 1980’s, began to organize in order to have their voices included in the process 
of their own recovery. It also looks at how the successes of this social movement 
ironically led to the prevalence of today’s diagnostic models of treatment that rely 
heavily on pharmacological methods and highly regimented evidence-based 
psychotherapies while still excluding patients’ voices. The voices of mental patients both 
in the asylum era and today have been excluded from the treatment process. 
The first section of the paper illustrates how patient resentment towards 
psychiatry emerged in post-war asylums. In doing so, I first examine the conditions in 
post-war American asylums. What were everyday interactions between doctors, workers, 
and patients like? I focus on Judi Chamberlin’s experience as a mental patient in 1966. In 
addition, I argue how the social dimensions of diagnoses influenced the daily lives of ex-
 vi 
patients through the rise of psychiatric social workers in the early twentieth century to 
show how the asylum system was not only a medical institution but a complex system 
where social, economic, and political interests intersected.   
The second section chronicles the emergence of advocacy groups in the early 
1970’s and their achievement in voicing their experience of treatment, culminating in 
testimonies before a Senate Subcommittee in 1975. To what extent did the public accept 
the patient experience in the asylum as a legitimate concern? I also pay attention to 
interdisciplinary scholarly analyses of madness to investigate how discussion of the 
subject influenced ex-patient activists, as well as whether or not the ex-patients’ narrative 
reciprocally influenced the scholarly discussion about madness.   
The third and final section examines how the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published in 1980 once more discredited 
the ex-patients’ narratives by enforcing a symptomatological mindset on treatment, 
effectively turning the narrative of people’s experience into an insignificant factor in the 
process of treatment, creating functionalistic therapeutic environments where the science 
of adjustment-maladjustment decided the direction of patients, urging them to adapt to 
oftentimes oppressive environments.       
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Chapter 1  
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF HOSPITALIZATION  
Introduction 
No, anger is not ‘nice,’ but it’s real, it comes from the gut, and not to be 
angry at being shit upon is being dead – which is exactly what shrinks and 
their kind want us all to become. That’s why they lock us up, drug us, cut 
into our brains with electricity and with knives if they possibly can – 
because our anger is POWER, and THEY ARE AFRAID OF US. And 
anyone who is not angry at what they do to us is as much as our enemy as 
the shrinks themselves. 
 
But anger is exhausting, and being put down for our anger is destructive. 
What we need is to be able to turn to one another for strength, for support, 
for understanding. There is a group in Boston called Mental Patients’ 
Liberation Front that does this. 
—Judi Chamberlin1 
 
 For a brief period in the 1970s, ex-patients in the psychiatric survivors movement 
reclaimed their collective voice, telling the public about the experiences of forced 
drugging, shock treatment, and seclusion that the psychiatric system had subjected them 
to.  In the above quote, Judi Chamberlin, an activist for the Mental Patients Liberation 
Front (MPLF), expressed frustration to her ex-patient colleague about how well-meaning 
but controlling mental health professionals were unintentionally trying to de-legitimize 
the ex-patients’ emotions and deny their voice during the third annual human rights and 
psychiatric oppression conference in 1975. She thought that the conference did not reflect 
a feeling of constructive anger from the ex-patients due to the presence of the 
professionals there. While acknowledging that uncontrolled anger is not constructive, she 
argued that patient anger was a legitimate expression since it resulted from the inhumane, 
                                                          
1
 [Judi Chamberlin, A 1975 letter to Tom, Conference on Human Rights and Psychiatric Oppression, 
Third ]. [ Judi Chamberlin Papers ] ( [MS 768] ), Special Collections and University Archives, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. 
 2 
degrading treatment that they received during hospitalization. She believed this anger 
could be a driving factor for change. During the era, patient advocacy groups fought on 
behalf of mental patients’ human rights. In order to achieve some degree of self-
determination over their lives, organizers like Chamberlin worked against involuntary 
commitment and in favor of informed choice in treatment as well as on behalf of patient-
run alternatives. The movement’s goals included having their experiences both heard and 
believed while receiving acknowledgement of their human rights from the wider society. 
An enormous problem facing patients was that they were considered unreliable 
and their accounts were therefore discredited precisely because they had had treatment. 
The public dismissed patients as “crazy” just because they had previously been 
hospitalized. Furthermore, the ex-patients argued that the psychiatric system denied the 
legitimacy of their narrative. Ex-patients wanted to have their experiences heard and 
believed by the wider society and to receive affirmation of their human rights. By 
reclaiming their voice, they were able to win back a degree of self-determination that the 
psychiatric system had previously taken away. Influential ex-patient organizers worked 
against involuntary commitment and in favor of informed choice in treatment and patient-
run alternatives.  
Why was it important for ex-patients to reclaim their voice? The patients believed 
that loss of voice meant loss of power, and that, consequently, this loss of power had 
enabled abuse to occur. Therefore ex-patients saw their collective voice both as the most 
effective weapon for destabilizing the inhuman system that had abused them and as the 
foundation for establishing a more humane patient-run alternative approach. They 
believed the alternative system would in turn allow them to challenge their diagnoses and 
 3 
reclaim their dignity in the wider society. In spite of their efforts, the process of de-
legitimizing the patients’ experiential narratives continues today in the age of de-
institutionalization where pharmacological treatments associated with the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders are in widespread use. 
The Asylum, 1960’s Style  
 
Angry at your shrink? Resisting therapy. 
Like your doctor? Positive transference. 
Nurses piss you off? You’re hostile. 
Cut your wrists? Acting-out again. 
Not hungry? Could be anorexia. 
Listening to the summer birds sing? Hope she’s not going to catatonic! 
Can’t stand Bingo? Antisocial. 
Won’t be intimidated? Dissociative reaction.  
Make a joke your doctor can’t understand? Thought processes disturbed. 
Think no one takes you seriously and they’re condemning you to a life as a social 
outcast? Paranoid and more paranoid! 
We Only Want to Help You—It rings like an ironic anthem of despair, over and 
over, in your ears and head, until you choke and gasp from the help and scream, 
“Okay. You win. I’ve no more heart to fight.” 
—Janet Gotkin2 
 
In this section, I chronicle ex-patient activists Judi Chamberlin and her long-term 
activist partner, Ted Chabasinski’s experiences during hospitalization to explain how life 
at an asylum--or “total institution” as Erving Goffman called it--meant that a patient’s 
voice was discredited as a symptom of their disease. Chamberlin argued that the severe 
depression that led to her involuntary commitment in psychiatric hospitals in the late 
1960’s came from the pressure to adapt herself to society’s idealized image of how 
women should be. Through the process of voicing her subjective experience of treatment, 
Chamberlin revealed how the scientific explanation of mental illness caused by a 
                                                          
2
 Janet Gotkin and Paul Gotkin, Too Much Anger, Too Many Tears: A Personal Triumph over 
Psychiatry (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 103. 
 4 
chemical imbalance in the brain negated the presence of the underlying social structure as 
a source of her distress. Embodied in the psychiatric system, society was what suppressed 
one’s will to be an emotional human being, inadvertently pressuring her to adapt to an 
oftentimes oppressive environment which coaxed her to take excessive doses of 
antipsychotics. I present Chamberlin’s experience as a mental patient as being 
representative of the “rootlessness” that many post-war women experienced. 
Chamberlin’s work as an ex-patient activist presented one aspect of the overall struggle 
on the part of mental patients to claim their place in a wider society.   
After a miscarriage at the age of twenty-one, Chamberlin experienced severe 
depression. A psychiatrist prescribed Thorazine and Stelazine after her first outpatient 
visit. After a few months with no improvement, the psychiatrist suggested she should be 
hospitalized. Like many white middle-class American women during the Cold War era 
who eagerly sought psychiatric or psychological help in order to adapt to their assigned 
role in society, Chamberlin never questioned that psychiatry would free her from her 
distress.3 She first committed herself to a psychiatric hospital on a voluntary basis in 
1966 and was eventually committed to six different psychiatric hospitals in New York. 
Her commitment to Rockland State Hospital was on an involuntary basis. After seven 
months, this experience with the psychiatric system left her with a diagnosis of chronic 
schizophrenia that required life-long custodial care.4 
 The social consequence of her diagnosis came four years later after a series of 
hospitalizations. After a divorce, Chamberlin lost custody of her only daughter on the 
                                                          
3
 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (Basic Books, 1988), 167. 
4
 Judi Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System (Lawrence: 
National Empowerment Center, 1977), 39, 55. 
 5 
grounds that she was “too mentally ill to be a fit mother.”5 Based on her medical records 
the court ruled that: “The mother has a long history of mental illness of depression, 
suicidal and homicidal feelings and has been confined to four hospital [sic] for treatment 
of psychiatric conditions. Her behavior is not that of a stable person to bring up a child.”6  
The document further mentioned her relationship with Ted Chabasinski, a Berkeley based 
activist/ attorney who is an ex-husband and long time friend of Chamberlin: “The mother 
has been divorced twice and is now married to her third husband, a former mental patient 
at Rockland State with a history of dementia praecox and inability to get along with 
people. The court observed him and considered him bland.”7  
 The influence of a diagnosis was not confined to the medical sphere; the diagnosis 
controlled the patient’s everyday life ranging from daily routine to crucial life choices, 
bolstering the socially constructed notion of disability.8 Patients who became dependent 
on the psychiatric system felt the social consequences of their diagnoses were so 
stigmatizing that many hid their experience in order to try to “pass” themselves as people 
who had never been treated for mental illness. Ted Chabasinski recollects how he used to 
“cover up” his psychiatric history to gain employment: “When I was younger and looking 
for jobs, applications routinely had questions like ‘Have you ever been treated for mental 
                                                          
5
 [ Testimony of Judi Chamberlin at the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency 
Series2 Organization: Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. Bayh, 
Birch]. [ Judi Chamberlin Papers ] ( [MS 768] ), Special Collections and University Archives, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.  
6[Family Court of the State of New York City of New York: County of Kings, Judi Chabasinski, petitioner, 
For Determination of Custody of Julie Ross Chamberlin, An Infant, against Robert H. Chamberlin, 
Respondent]. [ Judi Chamberlin Papers ] ( [MS 768] ), Special Collections and University Archives, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.  
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Derby Penney, Interview with Judi Chamberlin, www.community-consortium.org/projects/chamberlin-
judy.pdf , 39. 
 6 
illness?’ Of course I said no, and there was no way for them to check.”9 The ex-patients 
said “no” because the consequence of revealing one’s diagnosis was a social death 
sentence. Even though Chamberlin’s psychiatric history ended four years before the court 
ruling, the social stigma of the diagnosis deemed that she was unfit to be a mother for the 
rest of her life.  
 In 1966, sociologist Thomas Scheff examined mental illness from a sociological 
aspect, arguing that “deviants” who broke social rules were labeled as mentally ill. While 
arrest records between 1945 and 1948 obtained from mental hospitals in New York 
showed that the crime rate was “much lower” among former mental patients than the rest 
of the population, viewers of  television and readers of newspapers associated violent 
crime with former mental patients because of  biased coverage by the media. An 
unwarranted association between violence and mental illness stole into readers’ everyday 
colloquial conversations and permeating popular imagery of mental illness and its 
symptoms.10 This connotation suggests the “incurability of mental disorder; that is, it 
connects former mental patients with violent and unpredictable acts.”11 No matter how 
much mental health campaigns advocated for the rights of mental patients, the 
stereotypical visual imagery would label them as an “incurable deviants,” who “belong to 
a fundamentally different class of human beings or perhaps even a different species.”12 
 The stereotype of a mental patient as someone belonging to a different species 
could trace its root to the late nineteenth century. Influenced by the Darwinian theory of 
                                                          
9
 Ted Chabasinski, “Our Backs Are Against the Wall, so There’s No Way to Go But Forward,” Mad in 
America, accessed November 28, 2013, http://www.madinamerica.com/2013/10/backs-wall-theres-way-go-
forward/. 
10
 Thomas J. Scheff, Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 
1984), 58. 
11
 Ibid., 63. 
12
 Ibid., 61. 
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evolution, a German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin saw his patients as if they were passive 
carriers of symptoms. By popularizing the diagnosis of dementia praecox, a precursor of 
schizophrenia, he instilled the notion that mental patients were “immoral, perverts, 
psychopaths, almost a species apart.”13 Since he deemed that dementia praecox patients 
were a species born apart from human beings, there was nothing to bring the patients 
“back” to the rest of humanity.   
  Because of the stigmatization of mental patients as a non-human, ex-patients 
faced discrimination in returning to their former social status or even trying to find a new 
social position through employment or getting married. Some ex-patients hid their 
medical history in obtaining employment, thus indicating that the discrimination they 
experienced was largely due to such a stigmatized image of being violent and 
unpredictable rather than their behavior during a job interview.14 
In the late 70’s, the debate about the social construction of mental illness was 
widely argued by social theorists and ex-patients. In the early years of the psychiatric 
survivors movement, many activists rejected the medical model based explanation of 
mental illness. Instead, they argued that the notion of mental illness was a socially 
embedded concept. For them, the extreme emotional states they experienced were a 
spiritual transformation or a natural reaction to an extremely stressful condition often 
posed by an oppressive environment.15 To support their arguments, scholars argued how 
the notion of mental illness could be contingent upon the specifics of the social structure 
in which a patient was placed. Language like “wards of the state” reflected the 
                                                          
13
 Roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 184-185. 
14
 Scheff, Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory., 66. 
15
 Fred Pelka, What We Have Done: An Oral History of the Disability Rights Movement (Amherst: U of 
Massachusetts P, 2012)., 283. 
 8 
institutionalized nature of psychiatry. Embedded in everyday assumptions, people 
casually made a connection between mental patients and their dependency on state 
sanctioned social service agencies.16 Like children under the tutelage of guardians, 
mental patients’ voices were not considered credible; their anger and humiliation were 
largely dismissed as “symptoms” even though these feelings came from shock therapy 
and other inhumane treatment they received in asylums. Non-patients regarded the 
presence of such emotions as meaning that patients were paranoid and/ or had abnormally 
erratic feelings. 
To observe the social world of mental patients, sociologist Erving Goffman 
carried out fieldwork at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. between 1955 and 
1956. Based on this study, he coined the term a “total institution” where the members of a 
certain institution must remain in a place of residence within an apparent, either physical 
or symbolic, boundary for a continuous period of duration. By working at the hospital as 
a staff worker he captured the viewpoint of “hospital inmates”; he wanted to be as close 
as possible to their subjective experience.17 Viewing the asylum as a structured stage 
where the roles of actors were preconditioned, he observed the social interaction of 
inmates within the asylum, arguing how the outside society’s view of hospital inmates 
was dominated by the medical based explanation of mental illness. The reasons for 
starting a “career” as a mental patient in an asylum were contingent upon a variety of 
environmental factors ranging from the availability of resources to family troubles: 
Some of these contingencies in the mental patients’ career have been suggested, if 
not explored, such as socio-economic status, visibility of the offense, proximity to 
                                                          
16
 William H. Sewell JR., Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 2005), 356-7. 
17
 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1961), ix. 
 9 
a mental hospital, amount of treatment facilities available, community regard for 
the type of treatment given in available hospitals, and so on. For information 
about other contingencies one must rely on atrocity tales: a psychotic man is 
tolerated by his wife until she finds herself a boy friend, or by his adult children 
until they move from a house to an apartment; an alcoholic is sent to a mental 
hospital because the jail is full, and a drug addict because he declines to avail 
himself of psychiatric treatment on the outside; a rebellious adolescent haughtier 
can no longer be managed at home because she now threatens to have an open 
affair with an unsuitable companion; and so on… 
 
The society’s official view is that inmates of mental hospitals are there primarily 
because they are suffering from mental illness. However, in the degree that the 
‘mentally ill’ outside hospitals numerically approach or suppress those inside 
hospitals, one could say that mental patients distinctively suffer not from mental 
illness, but from contingencies.18  
 
For example, a woman consented to let a social worker examine her husband 
because the social worker detected “signs of mental disturbance” that might require him 
to be committed to an asylum. Apparently uneducated, the woman did not acknowledge 
her husband’s early signs of mental illness; she recognized his “crankiness,” but she 
thought it was due to “the way he was made.” She only agreed to let the social worker 
examine her husband because she thought “she would be better off without him.” For her, 
her husband’s “incorrigible laziness” was mere peculiarity, not a sign of mental illness. 
Sending him to an asylum happened to be one of the ways she could get rid of him.19 
Seventeen year old Jonika Upton was deemed mentally ill by her parents and 
doctors and was sent to Nazareth Sanatorium in Albuquerque in 1959. She ran away to 
California with a twenty-five year-old artist boyfriend that her parents assumed to be 
“homosexual.” While she was with the boyfriend, she developed a peculiar speech habit 
and began carrying “Proust” with her. After receiving electroshock on sixty-two 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 134-35. 
19
 Richmond, Social Diagnosis, 67. 
 10 
occasions, she completely forgot about her boyfriend and stopped carrying Proust. The 
cure was complete.20 
 While the hospital inmate’s role as a mental patient was delineated by broader 
social contingencies, the hospital workers also acted upon the role given by “society’s 
official view.” Gestures of maladjustment -- incompliance, rejection, and resistance by 
hospital inmates to accepting the “institution’s view of what and who he is” -- were by 
and large regarded as symptoms by the mental health workers. Hospital management 
“may construe this alienative expression as just the sort of symptomatology the institution 
was established to deal with and as the best kind of evidence that the patient properly 
belongs where he now finds himself.”21 
 When she was first hospitalized, Judi Chamberlin thought that only “crazy” 
patients went to the seclusion rooms because the people who went there looked as if they 
were out of control. It seemed illogical that screaming and banging on the door would 
lead to being released from the room. However, after experiencing the seclusion room, 
she suddenly felt that kicking and banging the door was a logical action: 
Although I had seen patients locked into seclusion from time to time, it was not 
something I thought could ever happen to me. Patients in seclusion were “crazy” 
– they screamed and banged on the door. Now it was me, and suddenly banging 
and kicking became logical. I had attempted to be reasonable, to explain myself – 
and this was what they thought of me. My anger mounted. I was not only a 
prisoner, I was a caged animal. Suddenly nothing was important except freedom. 
And freedom lay on the other side of a locked door.22 
 
                                                          
20
 Robert Whitaker, Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of the 
Mentally Ill (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002), 100-101. 
21
 Ibid., 306.  
22
 Judi Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System, 37. 
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 Goffman explains why Chamberlin had such a primal reaction while she was in 
the seclusion room with no furnishing and why nurses injected tranquilizers immediately 
after her reaction: 
The more inadequate this equipment is to convey rejection of the hospital, the 
more the act appears as a psychotic symptom, and the more likely it is that 
management feels justified in assigning the patient to a bad ward. When a patient 
finds himself in seclusion, naked and without visible means of expression, he may 
have to rely on tearing up his mattress, if he can, or writing with feces on the wall 
– actions management takes to be in keeping with the kind of person who 
warrants seclusion.23 
 
Willfully or not, an inmate at a total institution acquires various modes of adaptation to 
accommodate him or her to the environment. In ordinary circumstances, “playing it cool” 
or “keeping out of trouble” will suffice to “get by” in a total institution.24 However, when 
a situation like confinement to a seclusion room comes, no ordinary person can keep his 
or her cool.  
  A patient, who refers to herself as “we schizophrenics,” explains how terrifying it 
is for patients that doctors cannot understand what they are feeling and thinking, and how 
invalidating it is that doctors do not take patients’ words into account:  
Patients laugh and posture when they see through the doctor who says he will help 
but really won’t or can’t…They try to please the doctor but also confuse him so 
he won’t go into anything important. When you find people who will really help, 
you don’t need to distract them. You can act in a normal way. 
 
I can sense if the doctor not only wants to help but also can and will help… 
 
Patients kick and scream and fight when they aren’t sure the doctor can see them. 
It’s a most terrifying feeling to realize that the doctor can’t understand what you 
feel and that he’s just going ahead with his own ideas. I would start to feel that I 
was invisible or maybe not there at all. I had to make an uproar to see if the doctor 
would respond to me, not just his own ideas.25 
                                                          
23
 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, 306-7. 
24
 Ibid., 64-65. 
25
 M. L. Hayward and J. E. Taylor, “A Schizophrenic Patient Describes the Action of Intensive 
Psychotherapy,” The Psychiatric Quarterly 30 (1956): 211. 
 12 
 
 The psychiatrists and workers able to understand the inner world of patients, but 
they are trained not to take their words into account. The words of mental patients are 
regarded as beyond the comprehension of non-patients and thus belonging to a terrain of 
pathological delusions. Radical psychiatrists such as R. D. Laing, whose works 
influenced some of the ex-patients in the movement, urged his patients to embrace their 
psychotic experience as a journey to recovery even if such experience belonged to the 
“‘pathological’ zones of hallucinations, phantasmagoric mirages, delusions.”26 The 
majority of the mental health professionals regarded the inner experiences of mental 
patients as illegitimate.27  
 Nosology dominated the doctor’s decision making – that is: using the patient’s 
somatic presentation as the basis of diagnosis in order to define insanity. The diagnosis 
technique was based not on listening to patients’ stories but on looking at their behavior 
from an objective, almost god-like, bird’s eye perspective. However, Freud, rejecting the 
idea of “looking” at a patient, developed the knowledge and technique of psychoanalysis 
to “listen” to the patient’s unconscious.28 While the psychodynamic approach dominated 
the field in post war psychiatry, a small group of psychiatrists with a conventional 
biological approach criticized psychoanalysis as “a religion rather than a science.”29 The 
psychiatrists who opposed the hegemony of the psychodynamic and psychoanalytic 
approaches formed the Society of Biological Psychiatry in 1946. The members tended to 
prefer somatic approaches such as electroshock and psychosurgery, as well as 
neuroleptics in the 1950’s because they deemed psychotherapy as a time-consuming, 
                                                          
26
 R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Pantheon Book, 1967), 27.  
27
 Ibid., 167. 
28
 Sander Gilman, Seeing the Insane (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1982), 223. 
29
 Gerald Grob, From Asylum to Community (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), 293. 
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labor intensive, and impractical intervention for public asylums which housed thousands 
of chronically mentally ill people.30 Thus, Freud’s discovery was an unwanted offspring 
for clinical psychiatrists using the biological approach who worked all day with patients 
with schizophrenia and manic depression. The introduction of shock therapies such as 
insulin and metrazol shock therapies in pre-war asylums was the psychiatrists’ 
countermeasure against Freud’s psychoanalysis theory.31  
 In 1974, British psychiatrists Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine argued that 
psychiatry had taken a wrong turn: “Patients are victim of their brain rather than their 
mind. To reap the rewards of their medical approach, however, means a reorientation of 
psychiatry, from listening to looking.”32 For Roy Porter, the two psychiatrists essentially 
deemed that "the language of the mentally ill is an irredeemable babble."33 Not only 
Psychiatry and also medicine have a long history of relying on visual observation as an 
objective diagnostic tool. Even King George III’s well recorded fantasies during his bout 
of alleged insanity were regarded as uttering by his doctors.34 His words lost the authority 
of the King. In front of the doctor’s gaze, every patient has “democratically” lost the 
legitimacy of his/ her inner experience.   
 Seeing the symptoms and signs of illness was an acquired skill obtained through 
vigorous medical training. The process of noticing the symptoms and signs by looking at 
the patients became essential, and somewhat esoteric, medical knowledge for eighteenth 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., 292-93. 
31
 Laura Hirshbein, American Melancholy: Construction of Depression in the Twentieth Century (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2009), 24. 
32
 Roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 156-57. 
33
 Ibid., 156. 
34
 Ibid., 157. 
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century doctors, Michel Foucault argues. Backed up by institutional support, the 
European doctors enjoyed an unobstructed, dominating gaze which gave the “power of 
decision and intervention” over his patients in the hospital.35 It was no coincidence that 
this medical space embodied the ideal social space the Revolution dreamt of. At the same 
time, the state also dreamt of medicalized communities where doctors would be 
organized like a network of clergy.36 This medicalized, penetrating gaze needed to 
expand beyond the walls of hospitals. The architecture of discipline --prisons and 
hospitals--encapsulated the ideal, orderly space.37 Once the theory of discipline and 
control was tested in the form of architecture, town planning could refer to architectural 
theory. One could argue that Haussmann’s mid-nineteenth century Paris planning was 
something akin to the creation of the ideal medical and disciplinary space.  
 When a medical gaze is applied to the human mind, one wonders how 
psychiatrists can see the mind of patients. What constitute the visible symptoms and signs 
of mental illness? Without even minimally describing the inner experience of a patient, 
how does a doctor record the “abnormality” of patients? In recording madness, doctors 
focused on somatic representations of their patients in detecting symptoms and signs of 
madness. For example, Philippe Pinel, a late eighteen and an early nineteenth century 
French physician and a founder of moral therapy, used drawings to combine visual 
information and explanatory observation for educational purposes.38  
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 Until Pinel published A Treatise of Insanity in 1801, medical illustrations of 
madness were nonexistent. While illustrations for treatment procedures and visual 
description of asylum conditions were widely seen, pictures were not used as diagnostic 
tools. In compiling an educational, illustrated atlas demonstrating the signs and 
symptoms of mental illness, Pinel and his former student and colleague Jean Etienne 
Dominique Esquirol paid particular attention to the facial expressions of their patients. 
Physiognomy -- which gained an association with eugenics theory in the contemporary 
imagination-- was the first line of the diagnostic process.39 In diagnosing patients with 
mania and demonomania (a condition where a patient believed he/ she was possessed by 
evil spirits), Esquirol’s graphic atlas paid particular attention to their facial expressions. 
Because of his attention to this particular detail, "the patient is seen, as in the illustrations, 
devoid of context. The stark portraiture in the engravings, the absence of any background, 
the detail of position and mode of treatment (where employed) create an image of the 
insane as the object of a Linnean study, categorizable by external appearance."40 By 
creating a pure space devoid of any contextual information, patients’ symptoms and signs 
of madness were abstracted from their body and mind and presented as the visual truth of 
an illustration in an atlas. In the early nineteenth century psychiatry, the facial 
expressions of the mad were a pure sign of mental illness with nosological distinctions. 
  With the arrival of psychiatric photography in the mid-nineteenth century, visual 
nosology of madness gained further acclaim as an objective diagnostic apparatus. With 
the aid of this new technology, an English psychiatrist Hugh Welch Diamond developed 
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psychiatric photography. Through this photographic gaze, Diamond sought to capture 
truth, the “parallel between mind and body, between the appearance of the insane and his 
mental state.”41 Diamond believed the visual documentation of his patients was superior 
to recording the spoken words of his patients. By “listening” to what was captured in 
photographs, the psychiatrists were able to decipher the “silent but telling language of 
nature.”42 With the arrival of photography, the historic order where image was 
subordinate to text was reversed. Photography meant that words became merely 
"parasitic on the image" because photography was regarded as a pure replication of the 
truth.43 
 Is the gaze a value free mediation between the patient and objective medical 
truth? Psychiatric photography envisioned that the doctors’ gaze was as pure as the 
doctors’ precise and therefore “objective” observation of his patients. However, 
photography is not a value free enterprise. Esquirol’s drawings intentionally framed his 
patient in a plain background. The same practice is observed in Diamond’s photographs. 
In the blank space, he abstracted the photographed subject from any attached values that 
might cloud the diagnostic process. Roland Barthes explains how a photograph is 
believed to be “a mechanical analogue of reality, its first-order message in some sort 
completely fills its substance and leaves no place for the development of a second-order 
message."44 However, even the first-order message can be a culturally constructed 
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connotation, Barthes continues. The said realism of photography can be an “elaborate 
ideological construct and not a transparent window onto reality.”45  
 Once the premise that patients are in an asylum because they are mentally ill is 
firmly attached to patients, they are expected to play the role given by “society’s official 
view.” In order to be released from the asylum, patients are expected to navigate through 
multiple restraints from society, hospital staff, and the patient himself.46 Goffman argued 
that asylum patients are like players on a stage performing the spectacle of mental illness 
twenty-four hours a day, seven-days a week under the psychiatrists’ gaze. According to 
this view, doctors and health care workers are spectators who are eager to justify the 
reason of their existence in a given mental health system. Therefore, any deemed 
noncompliance by patients may be considered as symptomatic evidence of their 
pathology. In order to be released from the hospital, the patient has no choice but to 
accept their new environment and adjust accordingly.  
 Because her private hospital doctor considered that Judi Chamberlin needed long-
term custodial care, she was involuntarily sent to Rockland State Hospital after a series of 
commitments during 1966. The hospital architecture was intimidating, and the series of 
locked doors and key-operated elevators blatantly signaled that now she was in a “prison.” 
The barren, open ward was a nightmarish scene reminiscent of the 1948 movie, The 
Snake Pit. In an austere dayroom with barred windows, clad in shapeless “state clothes” 
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with the faded letters “RSH” across the back, Chamberlin was overwhelmed by the idea 
that she was going to stay there for the rest of her life. 
Back in the big, noisy dayroom I sank down on one of the wooden benches, drew 
up my knees, wrapped my arms around them, lowered my head, and began to cry 
quietly. A woman sat down beside me and leaned toward me. “Don’t do that,” she 
whispered. “They’ll think you’re depressed.” The consequences were unknown 
but ominous. I dried my eyes, straightened up, and looked around for something 
to do.47  
 
 Doctors and workers were observing her somatic presentation of mental illness in 
order to find evidence confirming that she needed long-term custodial care. Chamberlin 
quickly learned to hide her gestures of distress--what Goffman defines as “secondary 
adjustment,” --so she could get out of Rockland State Hospital “physically and 
psychologically undamaged.”48 To escape the penetrating gaze of workers and doctors 
eager to capture any and all signs and symptoms of mental illness, patients quickly 
learned the subtle tactic of not being seen as mentally ill by hiding their true feelings and 
emotions. 
 After dropping out of a prestigious women’s college in New England, Janet 
Gotkin started her “career” as a mental patient in 1962 following a suicide attempt at her 
psychiatrist’s office in Manhattan. Janet was sent to Oceanville Hospital in Belville, New 
York, “a repository of well-to-do misfits.”49  In contrast to Judi Chamberlin at Rockland 
State Hospital who quickly learned not to act like a “depressed” person, Janet learned 
how to act as a young adult mental patient at Oceanville Hospital. She deciphered signs 
and symptoms to “fit in” to her immediate environment. During sessions with a 
sympathetic resident psychiatrist, Dr. Steber, Janet thought he could see beyond her 
                                                          
47
 Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System, 41. 
48
 Goffman, Asylums; Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, 64-65. 
49
 Gotkin and Gotkin, Too Much Anger, Too Many Tears: A Personal Triumph over Psychiatry, 76. 
 19 
layers of adopted symptoms. She fervently told Dr. Steber that her stay in the hospital 
had made her sicker than before:  
“Listen,” I said. “I am not a disease and I’m not a child and I’m tired of being 
humiliated and talked down to and turned into a helpless invalid. This place is a 
goddamn school for psychosis. If you didn’t know the symptoms before you come 
in, you learn them, fast. And you adopt them, you start acting sick because you 
want to fit in and after a while this is the only place you have any hope of fitting 
in. If you’re not suicidal when you come, it doesn’t take long to get that way.”50 
 
Janet hoped Dr. Steber might be the one person who listened to his patients. However, he 
told Janet that she could not be released from the hospital because he saw she was trying 
to appear much less depressed in order to leave the hospital. Soon after the conversation, 
Dr. Steber left Oceanville Hospital for another hospital to complete his last year of his 
residency. Janet later learned that one of Dr. Steber’s patients had committed suicide two 
weeks after her discharge.51 If he had not listened to patients’ experiences, would he have 
made a “correct” decision - in this case, keeping his patient for a longer period than he 
actually did? If his patient remained in the hospital, would she have still committed 
suicide? 
 On the other hand, patients can use their symptoms in a cynical way either 
wittingly or unwittingly. Several patients in a large state hospital told Thomas Scheff “in 
confidence” how they had used their given symptoms to scare new personnel, to avoid 
doing unpleasant work details, and so on. “Yet, at other times, these same patients 
appeared to have been sincere in their symptomatic behavior. Apparently, it was 
sometimes difficult for the patients to tell whether they were playing the role or the role 
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was playing them.” 52 Whereas a psychiatrist like Thomas Szasz might have described a 
patient’s behavior as “malingering,” considering that a patient had made an individual 
choice in maneuvering inside of a system, Scheff analyzes the involuntary nature of role-
playing in explaining some patients’ uncertain behaviors. By referencing Ganser 
Syndrome (which is now described as a form of Dissociative Disorder) and Lemert’s 
sociological explanation of “secondary deviation,” he argues that even the patient him or 
herself could be confused with the role given to them by the institution; thus the 
dissociative or deviant action was either a defensive, offensive, or adjusting reaction to 
the immediate surroundings.53 Scheff shows the negotiation process within the self; how 
one navigates between one’s expected role in the given social system and the self, and 
how patients often lose their grip in the asylum by failing to navigate this treacherous 
terrain. Rather than focusing on how patients came up with coping strategies in an 
oppressive psychiatric environment, Scheff, Goffman, and  Foucault stressed how the 
system treated the patients as if they were a passive carrier of symptomatology. Their 
argument is somewhat concurrent to the protagonist’s fate in Ken Kesey’s One flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest where the protagonist McMurphy’s attempt to maneuver between the 
penal and psychiatric systems failed due to the involuntary, oppressive nature of 
psychiatry. As soon as a person found him/ herself in the system, he/ she lost the ability 
of self-determination. The passive, hollow imagery of mental patients was represented by 
McMurphy’s lobotomy scar.    
 The psychiatric gaze represented by photography and drawings attempts to create 
a pure space on paper. In this two-dimensional abstract space with no depth, even doctors’ 
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words are deemed to be secondary in value. The patients’ stories of their subjective 
experiences are meticulously eliminated as noise that might impede the diagnostic 
process. “Seeing” is an acquired technique that systematically removes cacophonous and 
often delusional impurityies. By referencing a systematized symptomatology, a specific 
somatic intervention is applied to patients without ever listening to their inner turmoil in 
order to make an accurate diagnosis. 
Social Diagnosis: the Rise of Psychiatric Social Workers 
 In this section, I briefly refer to Nina Ridenour’s 1961 book, Mental Health in the 
United States: A Fifty-Year History to provide a quick summary of the conditions of 
asylums as well as trends in mental health advocacy during the first half of the 20th 
century. Then I examine how trends in prevention and early detection of mental 
illness lead to the rise of social work during the same period.  
In explaining the origins of these new trends in psychiatry, Ridenour refers to 
Clifford Beers’ mental hygiene movement, showing how Beer’s movement promoted 
reformation among Americans, notably in the subject of child psychiatry from the grass 
roots level of a public awareness campaign. While Laura Hirshbein would later criticize 
the mental hygiene movement in her 2009 American Melancholy, stating that the 
movement was saturated by the “language of consumerism,” Ridenour in 1961considered 
it an educational, social movement that would improve Americans’ mental health.54 She 
stressed how “mental hygiene” meant a body of knowledge concerning the preservation 
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and promotion of mental health.”55 A growing number of mental health professionals, 
such as the psychiatric social workers who emerged in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, saw educating the public as the best tool in the early detection and prevention of 
mental illness.   
 In the first half of the book, Ridenour concisely demonstrated the emergence of 
psychopathic hospitals which at the time of publication were taking over from the 
custodial-care based “insane asylums.” Borrowing the 1920 phrase of Dr. Salmon’s 
“Cinderella story,” she explained how the concept of psychiatry was at that point a newly 
discovered discipline in the medical world.  The emergence occurred because of an 
increasing public interest in mental illness between 1900 and 1914, and she suggested 
that the growing number of people with mental illness, new social reforms, and scientific 
and medical discoveries were some of the reasons for this emergence.56  Along with the 
mental hygiene movement, new forms of somatic treatment arrived in the US. Therapies 
such as insulin shock, metrazol, and the electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) were introduced 
in the US by the late 1930’s. Drugs such as chlorpromazine (Thorazine) were considered 
dramatic breakthroughs in the early 1950’s. However, she concluded that these 
treatments were “overrated” as they did not “cure” illness; rather they simply sedated the 
patients.57 Psychosurgery (Lobotomy) was also introduced in the same period.  Regarding 
this procedure, she noted a “certain amount of controversy” that questioned the efficacy 
of the surgery. 58 
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 Ridenour discussed the need for child psychiatry. It is curious to see how she 
addressed the subject of juvenile delinquents in the context of the mental hygiene 
movement immediately alongside a discussion of the importance of establishing new 
facilities for the “mentally retarded.”59 Nonetheless, Ridenour was optimistic that citizens’ 
actions such as the mental hygiene movement would bear fruit in reforming post-war 
American mental health. She also focused on the need for community based, flexible, 
“open door” hospitals, and outpatient facilities, predicting the arrival of the 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in the next decades.60  
Jacques Donzelot analyzed the psychiatrists’ interest in controlling the juvenile 
court system in post-war France in his 1979 book The Policing of Families. He argued 
that the juvenile court system and the auxiliary psychiatry-social work system were a 
chimerical institution where medical, educational, socio-economic, political, and judicial 
distinctions intersected and blurred, a situation which many industrialized post-war 
nations experienced in common. In this bureaucratic machinery, socio-cultural values and 
norms were “made to float in relation to one another, enabling the individual to circulate 
back and forth between them, to play them off against each other” without ever being 
caught by specific agencies’ values or norms.61 In this chimerical, bureaucratic Tutelary 
Complex where multiple state and non state agencies’ responsibilities were obscured by 
design, state-sanctioned social agencies sneaked into the autonomy of the post-war 
working class family.6263  
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Since the early days of the privately funded asylums in late seventeenth century 
Europe, the asylum solution was “the site of myriad negotiations of wants, rights, and 
responsibilities, between diverse parties in a mixed consumer economy with a burgeoning 
service sector.”64 The line between private and public in social welfare was not clearly 
delineated. Social work was not an exception. Referring to a legal scholar Dean Roscoe 
Pound’s notion of “social” as something intermediary between public and individual 
affairs, Mary Cromwell Jarrett --a founder of American psychiatric social work-- and 
Elmer Ernest Southard argued that social workers were an ideal intermediary who could 
navigate between “public service on the one hand and the ideal of individual service on 
the other.”65  
Donzelot examined how social work stemmed from private philanthropy. The 
sudden proliferation of social work in America was due to the personnel shortage in 
neuro-psychiatric hospitals for the care of World War I soldiers. The theory and practice 
of social work were systematized during this time in order to train women in new social 
work programs.66 Jane Addams established her Hull House in 1889 after two years of 
travel in Europe. American social workers argued that in alleviating poverty, a shift from 
philanthropy to social work represented a sophisticated progression, because they 
believed that giving charity to the poor did not solve social problem at their root.67 
However, philanthropy should “not be understood as a naively apolitical term signifying 
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a private intervention in the sphere of so-called social problems,” Donzelot argued. It 
“must be considered as a deliberately depoliticizing strategy for establishing public 
services and facilitating at a sensitive point midway between private initiative and the 
state.”68 Since its formation as a discipline, social work was also “the site of myriad 
negotiations of wants, rights, and responsibilities,” where the boundary between private 
and public was blurred, constantly making reference from one to the other. 
In analyzing the Tutelary Complex, Donzelot paid particular attention to the 
growth of an invisible, “extrajudicial jurisdiction” of psychiatry that grew outside of a 
penal jurisdiction: 
 In the last third of the nineteenth century, psychiatrists began to refuse the terms 
according to which they were asked to offer their opinions regarding a particular 
defendant, even when adults were involved. To declare whether a criminal had 
acted in a state of insanity appeared pointless and metaphysical to them...They 
wanted to be able to concern themselves more with minors than with adults, more 
with petty offenses than with major crimes, more with the detection of anomalies, 
with orienting those sentenced to a particular mechanism of correction, than with 
grading the responsibility of those accused. They proposed to go beyond their 
minor function in the judiciary and achieve an autonomous position as prime 
movers in the prevention and treatment of delinquency, which in their eyes had 
become a mere symptom of mental aberration... A shift of interest that made 
possible the transition from restricted psychiatric expertise to generalized 
psychiatric expertise.69  
 
Psychiatric agencies developed an interest in intervening in the politics of the family 
through their expertise in the prevention of juvenile delinquency. Together with 
regulatory but non-coercive psychoanalysts, psychiatrists and social workers formed the 
“tutelary administration of families.”70 Overseen by psychiatrist-psychoanalysts, social 
workers functioned as an intermediary agency between families and the Tutelary 
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Complex. “Without getting their hands dirty, the psychoanalysts marks out the threshold 
from which his reign becomes possible.”71 
Like a detective doing their leg work, a social worker, traditionally a female 
profession, would collect evidences for her supervisors.72 To arrive at a social diagnosis 
of her client, she would visit her client’s home as if she went there to enjoy conversation 
with the investigatee. As a “friendly visitor,” she would try to detect signs of 
transgressions such as unsanitary conditions of the dwelling or promiscuities of family 
members through enjoyable conversation. Inspection of food stocks could be done by 
raising “the lids of a few cooking pots” as if they were housewives exchanging cooking 
tips each other.73 Mary E. Richmond, a pioneer in American social work, theorized about 
how to gather a wide range of evidence through inspection: “In social case work, real 
evidence is any item of evidence had by first-hand inspection. The appearance of a 
client’s home is real evidence as to the conditions under which he lives; the meal on the 
table is real evidence that his family is not without food; and so on.”74  
While psychiatrists gave medical diagnosis to the patients, a social worker also 
gave social diagnosis to her clients. Coined by Richmond, social diagnosis had a versatile 
nature that could be an “adjunct in the fields of medicine, education, jurisprudence, and 
industry.”75 Unlike medical doctors and psychiatrists who looked for signs and symptoms 
to arrive at their diagnosis, social workers saws signs of their clients’ maladjustment as 
being social symptoms.76 Richmond explained that social and medical diagnoses were 
                                                          
71
 Ibid., 168. 
72
 Gerald Grob, From Asylum to Community (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), 115. 
73
 Donzelot, The Policing of Families., 124. 
74
 Mary E. Richmond, Social Diagnosis (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1917), 56. 
75
 Ibid., 26. 
76
 Unemployment was a major sign of social symptom. 
 27 
complimentary to each other. As non-medical workers, social workers were not expected 
to make medical diagnoses, but were expected to refer to a medical authority who 
oversaw the routine of social work for the sake of early medical diagnosis.77 In addition 
to identifying and reporting any physical and mental breakdown, social workers also bore 
the role of educators for advocating the prevention and early detection of illness.  
The arrival of social work in the American mental health system signaled an 
interesting discussion in how female workers negotiated between their working-class 
clients on the one hand and doctors or judges on the other. Unlike psychologists, social 
workers (and psychiatric nurses) in the first half of the twentieth century did not 
challenge the authority of psychiatrists. In theory, they accepted a subordinate role as 
female professionals. They were not supposed to challenge the male-dominated field of 
psychiatry.78 By focusing on the premise that their profession was an intermediary 
agency, Jarrett and Southard advised that a young social worker should recognize herself 
as someone akin to a “professional layman.”79 They advised that these professional 
women should embody an “ideal being,” someone with a flexibility to take measures 
suited to the occasion. Within the specialty of social work they advised that these women 
should occupy their own ground.80 By keeping neutrality from the medico-judicial 
sphere, they believed these women could obtain a certain amount of autonomy:   
She stands in that middle ground, untrammeled by the laws and regulations of the 
public service and beyond the control in essential ways of the physician. So far as 
law and medicine are concerned, she is on rather neutral ground. In critical and 
limited phases of her work she is, to be sure, governed and guided by judge and 
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physician, but she has every chance to push on to crises and limits that may not be 
necessary and may not represent the 'one best way.' 81 
   
While the ideal social worker negotiated between the medico-judicial terrain and 
the welfare of her working class clients, foster families with adopted children saw social 
workers in another light.82 Born in 1937, Ted Chabasinski was adopted by a family in the 
Bronx. When a social worker from the child welfare agency determined he was also 
suffering from mental illness like his biological Polish immigrant mother, he was sent to 
Bellevue Hospital in 1943. He was six year old. He became one of the first test subjects 
for child neuro-psychiatrist Lauretta Bender who tested the efficacy of Electric 
Convulsive Treatment on children in treatment of childhood schizophrenia. The first use 
of the ECT on adult patients in the United States was in 1940.83 Before she started 
working as a staff psychiatrist in Bellevue Hospital in 1930, she had been a renowned 
psychiatrist who developed the Bender-Gestault Visual Motor Test in 1923. She became 
a senior psychiatrist who oversaw the Bellevue Children’s Service for twenty-one years, 
researching the etiology of childhood schizophrenia as well as child suicides and 
violence.  
The following is Ted Chabasinski’s testimony explaining how the social worker’s 
zealotry for the early detection of mental illness led to an experience beyond description: 
Psychiatrists and social workers had already decided before I was born that I was 
going to be a mental patient. My natural mother had been locked up just before 
she gave birth to me and was locked up again soon after. The social worker from 
the Foundling Hospital told my foster parents, as they put it, that my mother was 
“peculiar,” and Miss Callaghan soon had them looking for symptoms in me, too. 
Every month Miss Callaghan would come and discuss my “problem” with my 
foster parents. If I only wanted to stay in the back yard with my sister and make 
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mud pies, this was a sign that I was too passive and withdrawn, and my mommy 
and daddy were supposed to encourage me to explore the neighborhood more. 
When I started to wander around the neighborhood, I went to a neighbor’s garden 
and picked some flowers. The neighbor complained, and Miss Callaghan held a 
long session with my parents about curbing my hostile impulses.  
 
I knew that my foster parents were afraid of the Foundling Hospital lady, but I 
didn’t understand why… 
 
When Miss Callaghan had discovered enough symptoms, I was sent to the 
Bellevue children’s psychiatric ward, to be officially diagnosed and to be made an 
experimental animal for Doctor Bender, I was one of the first children to be 
“treated” with electric shock. I was six years old.84 
        
The autonomy of family was compromised for the sake of the early “detection of 
anomalies.” The social diagnosis was made by social workers by referring to the child’s 
family history and to the “peculiarity” of a child’s behavior as the signs of schizophrenia. 
Lost in the nightmare of the Tutelary Complex where psychiatrists in an autonomous 
position had absolute power over him and his foster family, Chabasinski was physically 
and sexually abused and underwent repeated electroshock “treatment” as a part of Dr. 
Bender’s experiments.85  
…It took three attendants to hold me. At first Doctor Bender herself threw the 
switch but later when I was no longer an interesting case my tormenter was 
different each time.  
 
I wanted to die but I really didn’t know what death was. I knew that it was 
something terrible. Maybe I’ll be so tired after the next shock treatment I won’t 
ever get up, and I’ll be dead. But I always got up. Something in me beyond my 
wishes made me put myself together again. I memorized my name, I taught 
myself to say my name. Teddy, Teddy, I’m Teddy…I’m here, I’m here, in this 
room, in the hospital. And my mommy’s gone… I would cry and realize how 
dizzy I was. The world was spinning around and coming back to it hurt too much.  
I want to go down, I want to go where the shock treatment is sending me, I want 
to stop fighting and die…and something made me live, and to go on living I had 
to remember never to let anyone near me again.86 
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Until he was released from Rockland State Hospital at the age of seventeen, he 
spent the majority of childhood and adolescent years in the psychiatric system. In 1955 
Lauretta Bender received the Adolf Meyer Memorial Award for “her contributions to the 
understanding of schizophrenic children.”87  
In this chapter, I examined how the experience of hospitalization left a negative 
mark on ex-patients’ lives by looking at ex-patients’ testimonies and scholarly works 
about the psychiatric institutions. The subjective experiences of extreme emotional 
distress did not weigh at all in understanding a patient’s inner world.  Instead, their 
behavior was interpreted out-of-context to warrant why they needed treatment.  The label 
of being a mental patient dictated their perceived identities, making them unable to 
escape from the social consequences of diagnosis. I explained how the labeling process 
was produced by looking at the history of psychiatry and social work in the early 
twentieth century. I paid particular attention to how the social worker’s well-intentioned 
mission to save working class children from chronic mental illness often led to traumatic 
experiences for the children. In the next chapter, I will examine how ex-patients in the 
early 1970’s organized themselves to fight against the psychiatric label.   
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Chapter 2 
TO CLAIM THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR VOICE 
We are mental patients. We believe that we have “gone crazy” because we live in 
a society that puts wealth, property, and power above the basic needs of human 
beings. We have been locked up in institutions, rendered powerless to control our 
own lives, told we are incapable of making our own decisions because we do not 
know what is in our “best interests,” and subjected to various forms of 
“treatment” meted out by a psychiatric elite. 
We believe that mental hospitals do not meet basic human needs. Treatment such 
as drug therapy, electroshock, behavior modification and even psychotherapy are 
used to depoliticize and to force us to conform to the status quo. 
 
 —Mental Patients Liberation Front88 
 
The Mushrooming of Patient-run Groups in the Early 1970’s 
Ex-patients advocacy groups, such as the Mental Patients Liberation Front, began 
to organize with the aim of reclaiming the legitimacy of their voices but had to contend 
with a public that generally regarded ex-patients narratives as unreliable. This public 
generally believed that: “mental patients are supposed to be mentally ill, out of touch 
with reality, their testimony carries little weight.”89 However, due to a wide range of 
activism in the 1960s and 1970s, “psychological disorders were understood more in 
social and political (less in strictly individualized) terms.”90 In 1975, ex-patients gained 
landmark achievements through their national-level political action.91  
 In the summer of 1971, Judi Chamberlin joined the newly formed Mental Patients 
Liberation Project (MPLP.) Started by Howard Geld, aka Howie the Harp, in April 1971, 
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the MPLP was one of the first patient-run organizations advocating for the rights of 
mental patients.92  The Insane Liberation Front, started in 1970 in Portland, Oregon, was 
the earliest advocacy group in the US. The Mental Patient Liberation Front (MPLF) in 
Boston that Judi Chamberlin later joined started in 1971, almost simultaneously with the 
MPLP.  
Many ex-patients tried to hide their history of commitment in order to “fit into” 
the society, unable to share their experiences of inhumane treatment with other ex-
patients. After Chamberlin was discharged from Rockland State Hospital in 1966, she 
tried to look as “normal” as possible. She moved to Pennsylvania with her husband and 
had a daughter, Julia, in 1968. While she was in Pennsylvania, she came in contact with 
the counter-culture through a poet at the Pratt Institute in Brooklyn who was working on 
publishing a psychedelic art book. After 1968, she enrolled in colleges in Pennsylvania 
and New York City but did not complete a degree. During this time, she came in contact 
with women’s groups and decided to leave her husband in 1971 and divorced him the 
next year. Until Chamberlin learned about the MPLP from The Village Voice, she did not 
realize there were many people like her, people who had been committed to mental 
hospitals and who had received forced treatment and suffered countless humiliations. The 
MPLP gave Chamberlin a sense of liberation and empowerment. Just as Chamberlin had 
gained a sense of self-determination from the women’s liberation movement, other 
members in the MPLP had also been involved with other human rights and civil rights 
movements. Ted Chabasinski, who also joined the MPLP just prior to Chamberlin, had 
joined the NAACP in 1959 through a local chapter in the City College of New York 
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where he graduated in 1961. The son of a Polish Catholic and a Russian Jew, he took the 
plight of the black people in the South as something very personal. His leadership in 
organizing came from a shared sense of oppression he experienced due to his 
commitment to Bellevue Hospital at age six: “I did it (taking an active role in the 
NAACP) because I recognized that their oppression was just like mine. Here are these 
people being pointed to, ‘They’re not human, they don’t deserve any respect, we’re going 
to treat them like dirt.’”93  
 While he was in Harvard University, David Oaks was committed to McLean 
Hospital in Belmont, Massachusetts in the early 70’s. As a third generation Lithuanian 
who had grown up in the South Side of Chicago, he studied and worked hard to lessen the 
financial burden on his family while he was in Harvard. He later recognized the amount 
of stress he was under triggered the “extreme” states of mind he experienced. He saw 
visions that other people did not see or sense: “I would look at technology as a kind of an 
alien force on the planet: electricity and telephones and computers and radio and 
machinery. I would be riding in an airplane and become convinced that my mind could 
somehow affect the bolts in the airplane. That I had these superpowers.”94 After he was 
released from McLean, Oaks joined the MPLF in 1976 during his senior year. He 
recollects how they operated their meetings in the same way leftist organizers and 
women’s advocates would.95 The discussions about prisoner’s rights, gay rights, racism, 
sexism, and class issues were frequent topics for the survivors since they thought 
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psychiatry had been targeting those who were regarded as vulnerable.96 With tactics, 
theories, and philosophy gained from various human rights movements, the ex-mental 
patients were ready to start their own civil rights movement. 
 Leaving New York City for Vancouver, British Columbia in 1974, Judi 
Chamberlin began experiencing a sense of overwhelming distress again. Ending her 
relationship with Ted Chabasinski left her with an overwhelming sense that she would 
die.97 After a turbulent but powerful transformational experience at the Vancouver 
Emotional Emergency Center, she moved to Bellingham, Washington. She tried 
unsuccessfully to establish an ex-patients group in Bellingham. In spite of her 
unsuccessful attempt, 1975 was a transformational year for survivors involved in ex-
patients advocacy groups. For example, the Supreme Court ruling of O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, a case brought by an ex-patient, decided that even if one presented symptoms 
of mental illness, a state could not involuntarily commit a non-dangerous individual to a 
psychiatric hospital.98 The Court determined that there was a constitutional right to 
liberty in the case. Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily committed to a state hospital in 
Florida in 1956 because his father worried that his son, who was visiting from 
Philadelphia, was showing signs paranoia. Over the next fifteen years, Donaldson 
received a series of drug and shock therapies that often reached the level of malpractice.99  
  For Chamberlin, it was also a crucial year; she began writing a book, On Our 
Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System to promote the ex-
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patient controlled alternative to psychiatry. The American public was also undergoing a 
transformation in 1975; the release of the movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
helped raise awareness about abuse in psychiatric hospitals to a broader audience.  
1975 Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency 
 In August of that year, Chamberlin testified as an ex-patient for the Senate 
Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency chaired by Birch Bayh. With other ex-patients 
and freelance writers such as Janet Gotkin, Wade Hudson, and Anthony Brandt, she 
spoke to the public about how Thorazine gave her an overwhelming sense of fear, 
anxiety, and jitteriness.  
 The subcommittee was investigating the use of neuroleptics (antipsychotic drugs 
such as Thorazine, Prolixin, and Haldol) at Juvenile Institutions. A medical journalist 
Robert Whitaker argues that this was the moment when ex-patients persuaded legislators 
and the public that the experience of neuroleptics was inhumane because it turned 
patients into “zombies.” In oral testimony and writing they eloquently told the public 
about their subjective experience of neuroleptics.100 Chamberlin testified to Senator Bayh 
how a vicious cycle of medication during the time of her hospitalization created drug 
dependency. While she was in the psychiatric system, she was administered Thorazine, 
Stelazine, Mellaril, Elavil, Cogentin, Doriden, and Chloral Hydrate.101 In order to explain 
the cycle of drug dependency ex-patients had fallen into as well as the experience of 
over-medication, she referred to the Physicians’ Desk Reference which stated that to 
compensate for the drowsiness caused by Thorazine, a doctor should give 
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Dextroamphetamine, an addictive stimulant. When a patient experienced uncontrollable 
tremors caused by Thorazine, the doctor would prescribe Cogentin to control the 
muscular spasm. Cogentin’s side effect is “intensification of mental symptoms, mental 
confusion and excitement, visual hallucinations, and dry mouth.” To suppress those 
unwanted effects, more Thorazine was administered. She concluded that the vicious cycle 
of drug dependency she experienced during hospitalization made her less determined to 
improve her life situation. 
 Another survivor with a diagnosis of “chronic schizophrenic,” Janet Gotkin 
explained how her dependency on drugs as well as on her psychiatrist, Dr. Sternfeld, 
forced her to make a humiliating gesture to him: “I went down on my hands and knees 
for higher dosages of the drug…I believed I was mentally ill, and I believed I needed 
drugs:”102  
“Please I need something.” 
“Then beg for it.” 
Down on my hands and knees on the rug, my face buried in the dust. Can I go any 
lower? “Why are doing this to me?” 
“I want you to see how you lower yourself to get what you want.” 
This is therapy, this groveling humiliation? No. Something is very wrong. He is 
smiling, almost. 
“I will call the ward and order an increase.”103 
 
 The more Dr. Sternfeld wrote prescriptions the more “merciful” he appeared to 
be. Totally subjugated by the power of her psychiatrist, Gotkin even thought about how 
generous he was; Dr. Sternfeld prescribed 1,500 mg of Thorazine for her anxiety, 
Kemadrin for relaxing the muscles that became stiff by the side-effect of Thorazine, 
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Compazine for stomach nausea, and Prolixin for her depression.104 Her ten year career as 
a mental patient caused her to have an extensive prescription list. At the testimony to the 
Subcommittee, Gotkin itemized what she had taken: “Over the years I took almost every 
drug on the market: Thorazine, Mellarill, Taractan, Compazine, Stelazine, Serax, Prolixin 
(Permatil), Valium, Librium, Miltown, Doriden, Nembutal, Seconal, Tuinal, Chloral 
Hydrate, Sodium Amytal (by injection), Dexamyl, Kemadrin, Tofranil, Elavil. You name 
it, I took it; often in combinations; mostly at very high dosage.”105 In 1970, Dr. Sternfeld 
prescribed 2,000 mg of Thorazine, such a high dosage that she had convulsions.106 After 
the incident, he reduced it to 1,800 mg.107 Currently the FDA determines that the doctors 
can gradually administer up to 2,000 mg or more a day to some hospitalized patients if 
deemed necessary, but also advises the prolonged dosage of more than 1,000 mg a day 
has little therapeutic benefit.108 What would a patient on 2,000 mg of Thorazine look 
like? While she was committed, Chamberlin saw a patient with the prescription. A 
“walking zombie,” she described the patient because she walked in whatever direction 
her shoulder was pushed towards. To make her turn the corner, others would push her 
shoulder harder.109      
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 The side effects of those drugs left Gotkin physically and mentally unable to 
manage her daily life. It made her so drowsy that she fell asleep during the day. She 
could not concentrate enough to finish reading a novel or watching a movie. She felt her 
tongue was so heavy that she was barely able to speak. Her eyesight was so blurred. 
Those everyday tasks required such an effort that she always felt exhausted. The drugs 
made her put on weight. To control involuntary hand and leg movements the doctor also 
prescribed Kemadrin. To reduce the unbearable skin sensation, Benadryl was 
administered to stop the itching.  
 Recollecting her years as a mental patient, Gotkin testified how she had become 
disconnected from herself by all of these prescribed medication. She realized what she 
really needed was to look into her life problems:   
In all the years I took these drugs never, once, did they in any way help me to 
solve my problems or come in touch with my feelings. Quite the contrary. I never 
had to face any problems because they were all called “symptoms” and I was 
given drugs to deal with them. I became alienated from my self, my thoughts, my 
life, a stranger in the normal world, a prisoner of drugs and psychiatric 
mystification, unable to survive anywhere but in a mental hospital. The anxieties 
and fears I had lay encased in a Thorazine cocoon and my body, heavy as a bear’s, 
lumbered and lurched as I tried to maneuver the curves of the outside world.110 
 
 Gotkin broke her ten-year cycle of drug dependency after a five-day coma caused 
by a suicide attempt in 1970. Gotkin’s husband, Paul Gotkin wondered if his wife might 
have gone through a “mysterious and profound change” while she was in her coma. As 
soon as she recovered from the coma, Paul Gotkin noticed how she was in “good sprits,” 
able to concentrate and to sleep like she had been unable to for the last ten years. He 
                                                          
110
 [ Janet Gotkin's testimony, 5, Series 2 Organization: Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. Bayh, Birch ]. [ Judi Chamberlin Papers ] ( [MS 768] ), Special 
Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.  
 39 
conjectured that during the five-days, all the antipsychotics were flushed out of her 
body.111 
 In order to complete his book project about the mental health system, a freelance 
journalist named Anthony Brandt committed himself to the Judson River State Hospital 
in Poughkeepsie, New York. By feigning that he was hearing voices of his separated 
wife, he experienced what it would be like to become a mental patient. At the testimony, 
he spoke about rampant, indiscriminate use of neuroleptics during his eleven-day 
voluntary commitment to the hospital. He conjectured the use of such drugs was not to 
treat symptoms but to manage patients’ behavior. Through the interview projects, Brandt 
learned that an ex -patient from Binghamton State Hospital in New York was 
administered liquid Thorazine. Everyone on his ward had the drug “out of a bucket.” 
Everyone had the same dosage regardless of their diagnoses.112 Chamberlin also took 
undiluted liquid Thorazine while she was in Rockland State Hospital in 1966. The 
manufacturer warned nurses to wear gloves while handling the liquid to avoid skin 
irritation.113 The drug burnt her throat, and the humiliation was so grave that she would 
often cite the experience in her speeches.  
 Administering liquid Thorazine was a standard operation for many state-run 
hospitals. Andrew Palmer who was in Gaebler Children’s Center in Waltham, 
Massachusetts in the mid-70’s recollects how nurses gave him liquid Thorazine mixed 
with cranberry juice. The “thorazine cocktail” in a small plastic cup was administered 
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three times a day.114 Each time he swallowed, the liquid burnt his mouth. He had no 
choice but to take the cocktail; nurses demanded that he open his mouth to make sure he 
had swallowed it.  
  Judi Chamberlin was able to improve her life circumstance by stopping taking 
any drugs and by voluntarily seeing a skilful, confident, and empathetic psychologist.115  
At first, Chamberlin thought she was so “hopelessly mentally ill” that she hesitated about 
seeing Dr. Jonas. Chamberlin thought that only custodial care in an institution suited her 
because she had an “abnormality” in her brain. Skeptical about her claim, Dr. Jonas asked 
Chamberlin to give signed permission to release her hospital records. After looking 
through the records, he explained to Chamberlin how the diagnoses she had received 
during her hospitalization came from observations by inexperienced trainee doctors 
whose judgments were clouded by their own egos:  
“Everything in here,” he told me, “was written by young doctors just out of 
medical school. They like to use these big words but don’t know what they mean. 
Who would you rather believe—them, or me, a doctor who’s been in practice for 
years?” “What about my diagnoses? I’ve seen some of them—that I’m a 
schizophrenic, that I have a character disorder.” “Nonsense,” he told me.116 
 
 At the subcommittee, Chamberlin also brought attention to Tardive dyskinesia 
(TD), an irreversible syndrome caused by the prolonged administration of high-dose 
neuroleptics. In the most severe cases, TD resembled “in every respect known 
neurological diseases such as Huntington’s disease, dystonia musculorum deformans, and 
                                                          
114
 Andrew Palmer, “Gaebler, Hell and Back,” accessed March 11, 2014, 
http://www.madpride.org/VFC10GaeblerHellandBack.htm. 
115
 [ Testimony of Judi Chamberlin at the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 
Series2 Organization: Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. Bayh, 
Birch]. [ Judi Chamberlin Papers ] ( [MS 768] ), Special Collections and University Archives, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.  
116
 Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System, 55. 
 41 
postencepalitic brain damage,” a National Institute of Mental Health physician noted.117  
Chamberlin explained that the somatic presentation of TD is what “one would most 
expect to be crazy-looking. These repetitive, unpleasant looking movements are not 
symptoms of so-called mental illness. They are the direct result of long-term 
administration of Thorazine.”118  
 In summarizing the questions surrounding the drug use in these institutions, 
Gotkin concluded that the answer did not belong to scientific or medial explanations. She 
saw it as political in nature.119  Gotkin observed how the way drugs were dispensed 
represented a power game between a doctor and a patient. Because she was dependent on 
the drugs, she showed total submission to Dr. Sternfeld. She felt that power politics were 
particularly fierce at prisons and schools for children with intellectual disability: “The 
people who run them have been virtually free of any outside scrutiny or constraint on 
their behavior and have fought hard to maintain that closed status.”120 For people who 
survived psychiatric experience, the stories of abuse were nothing new, but because of 
the closed nature of those institutions, the public had little idea about what was happening 
inside of the walls of the total institution. Convinced by the testimonies of ex-patients, 
Senator Bayh called indiscriminate administration of neuroleptics to mental patients 
“chemical straightjacketing.” He concluded: “We cannot sit by and let children in the 
nation, because they are without parents or troubled or handicapped be boxed up, shipped 
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off and held captive with medical or chemical handcuffs.”121 Because ex-patients like 
Chamberlin and Gotkin eloquently spoke about their subjective experiences of 
commitment before the 1975 subcommittee, the public began to listen to their stories and 
regard their testimony as credible.  
  
 The political aspect of involuntary commitment was a key issue for ex-patient 
advocates like Chamberlin. Like the scholars in the anti-psychiatry movement, Judi and 
her colleagues saw psychiatry as a monolithic entity that possessed absolute power to 
determine the course of people’s lives. They saw psychiatry, and subsequently the state, 
in a black and white way in order to use this stark contrast to unite themselves as 
survivors of the psychiatric system. They argued that if patients were held in psychiatric 
hospitals on an involuntary basis, they had no right to refuse “treatment.” From the 
patient’s perspective, the function of involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital 
was not to treat one’s acute psychiatric distress but rather to prevent the patient’s social 
transgression and maladjustment. An array of specialists assessed how likely a patient’s 
pathological behavior was to cause danger to themselves or to others as well as whether 
this behavior could be contained by keeping the patient under custodial care at a state 
hospital. Recollecting the memory of hospitalization, ex-patients showed resentment 
towards a phrase like “you are here because we want you to get better.”   
 For ex-patients, “getting better” was an ironic justification of the psychiatric 
system by mental health professionals. One ex-patient, Dorothy Nissen Sibley, satirically 
drew an illustration of a male doctor whose right hand is about to turn on the ECT 
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machine while a female patient is lying on the table. The doctor tells her: “I’m only doing 
this for your own good.” The patient looking blankly at the ceiling wonders: “What 
would you do to me if you were trying to hurt me?”122  By experience, they felt that the 
primary function of involuntary commitment was not “getting better” but rather to keep 
them under the observation of trained specialists.123 Voicing their discontent or even 
showing a strong gesture of resentment by patients was taken as proof that they needed 
more care.  
 What does “getting better” mean? The psychiatric survivors argued that the 
psychiatric hospital was not a medical institution but rather akin to a seventeenth century 
“house of confinement” where the act of transgression justified confinement. A San 
Francisco based group, the Network Against Psychiatric Assault (NAPA) reviewed 
Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization as a “good historical account of the origins 
of psychiatric oppression by a liberal professional.” While they pointed out Foucault’s 
failure to challenge the very concept of “madness,” they agreed with his interpretation of 
the large scale confinement of the masses as representing “no medical advance” but 
rather accommodating the “needs of a rising capitalism.”124 As explained by Foucault, 
these “prisons of moral order” contained the double role of policing and church politics. 
Since Sloth represented rebellion in Christianity, the reluctance to work was thus 
indicated not only as idleness but also as an active moral incompliance. Moral and 
economic activities inherently entwined with each other, the idler was involuntarily sent 
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to forced labor at the house of confinement to correct his/ her moral disorder. In society, 
the degree of morale was measured by employment. According to this measure, 
unemployment and madness –the embodiment of savage-like unreason–were aligned 
closely together in the terrain of moral corruption.125  
The Rise of Anti-Psychiatry Scholars 
 Until the early 1970’s, psychiatric patients, by and large, did not have a voice in 
their treatment because psychiatrists rarely valued their agency in describing their 
experiences. Gaining popularity in the 1960’s, the scholars in anti-psychiatry questioned 
the conventional practices of psychiatry such as “invasive” treatments like electro-shock, 
tranquilizers, and deep-freezing from an academic standpoint and provided an intellectual 
framework for the ex-patient activists.  The proponents of the movement looked at how 
psychiatry had been harming the development of a “natural way of healing our own 
appalling state of alienation called normality” in the words of R.D. Laing, one of the 
proponents of the movement. 126 The supporters of Antipsychiatry argued that rather than 
coaxing the individual to “adjust” to society through “treatment,” the society that thrust 
conformity upon people needed to be interrogated and changed.127 Created by the 
psychiatrist David Cooper in his 1967 Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, the term Anti-
Psychiatry was used to explain the works of Michel Foucault, R. D. Laing, Thomas Szasz, 
Franco Basaglia, as well as Erving Goffman.128  In this section, I will focus on three 
works from scholars from the 1960’s associated with the anti-psychiatry movement: 
Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization (Published in French in 1961, translated in 
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English in 1967), R.D. Laing’s the Politics of Experience (1967), as well as Thomas 
Szasz’s the Myth of Mental Illness (1961).  
Michel Foucault 
 Madness and Civilization was the first major work of French historian and 
philosopher Michel Foucault. Published in French in 1961, the work interrogated the 
transformation of the relationship between power and madness in classical era Europe. 
Through the work, he demonstrated the temporality of the concept of madness. When 
explaining the fear of madness inherent to post Revolution Paris, Foucault wrote that “the 
awareness of madness is on the contrary accompanied by a certain analysis of modernity, 
which situates it from the start in a temporal, historical, and social context.”129 Examining 
the period between the opening of the Hôpital Général in 1657 during the so called 
“Great Confinement” to the “moral” treatment carried out by Philippe Pinel in the Bicêtre 
Hospital in 1794, Foucault argued how the awareness of madness outlined a similar 
landscape of society, explaining how a practice related to “the mad” was influenced by 
notions engendered by society.130  
 In explaining how the mode of containment of the mad was influenced by an 
institutional character peculiar to a certain time frame, Foucault started from the 
disappearance of lazar houses (leper colony) in France, England, Scotland, and Germany 
at the end of the Middle Ages.131 However, the imagery attached to the exclusion of 
leprosy survived, gaining a new symbolic adherence to “poor vagabonds, criminals, and 
‘deranged minds.”132  During the Renaissance, the “Ship of Fools” captured the artistic 
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sensibility of the Rhine-Flemish region. The ships actually existed as a mechanism of the 
cure and exclusion of the mad where they were seized as “pilgrims.”133 The long-standing 
symbolic adherence to the therapeutic quality of water kept resurfacing throughout the 
history; the quality of ablution and impregnation dominated the discourse of madness 
cures from the end of the seventeenth century. Water was believed to cool the boiling 
blood of the mania and frenzy. 134 The same notion of hydrotherapy was used until the 
1970’s to calm agitated patients. The patients were routinely kept in water for eighteen 
hours a day.135 
 The awareness of madness underwent a radical change in the classical period. 
Foucault argued that the socially invented space of confinement was “an institutional 
creation peculiar to the seventeenth century.”136 Instead of excluding the mad through 
embarkation, now the docile bodies of the poor, unemployed, prisoners and the insane 
were sent to the “house of confinement,” sharing the same space with each other.137 In 
explaining the historic event called the Great Confinement, he explained how the imagery 
related to the mad affected the practice. The mind of delirium used to belong to darkness. 
In this dream-like state of landscape, man’s reason was dazzled. Since his relation to truth 
was darkened, it signified that he was in the domain of unreason; in the age of reason, 
madness meant unreason.138 Unlike the Renaissance where the mad freely walked around 
town, the madman in the classical age were regarded as something that had to be 
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confined, to be looked at. The madman’s animal-like image gained an association with 
cages, bars, and chains.139 
 In the Age of Enlightenment where the “blindness of madness” signified the 
milieu of unreason and moral fault, the objective of the hospital shifted from physical 
restraint to moral correction.140 By bringing the cure of madness to the realm of guilt, 
Foucault states, “Psychology, as a means of curing, is henceforth organized around 
punishment. Before seeking to relieve, it inflicts suffering within the rigor of a moral 
necessity.”141 In the era of early nineteenth century positivism, the madman who had 
been deemed as the object of unreason became one of corrupted morals. Now the mad 
became the object of scientific observation.142  
   In post Revolution Paris, where a series of humanitarian reforms were carried out, 
the practice of confining the mad and prisoners in the same space was regarded as 
“degrading.” A physician Philippe Pinel freed the insane chained in the dungeon of 
Bicêtre Hospital in 1793, then became a chief physician of the Salpêtrière Hospital in 
1795.143 Like the English Quaker William Tuke, who recreated the idealized view of the 
bourgeois family in his York Treatment in 1796, Pinel also attempted to recreate and 
reinvent the microcosm of his idealized society in correcting the mad.144 Inside of Pinel’s 
moralistic space, madness was punished because of its moral failure. Instead of the 
physical confinement of the classical era, the “madman” now became a prisoner of 
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himself trapped in a moral world. In Pinel’s space, madness is the “very symbol of the 
confining power.”145 
 While Madness and Civilization was filled with Foucault’s curious explanation of 
the “imaginary landscape of qualities” where madness was explained through the concept 
of bile, humor, vapor, spirit, sympathy, and fiber inside of a body, his work also became a 
target of criticism.146 For example, an American historian David J. Rothman criticizes 
Foucault’s lack of awareness of temporal and geographical differences in his 1990 
introduction of the Discovery of Asylum:  
Foucault was a moral philosopher whose own construction of the historical 
process became the text on which he grounded a series of discourse on the nature 
and exercise of power and authority in western civilization. He was not by 
temperament, by training, or by practice a historian – that is, he not only 
eschewed archival research but had little respect for the nuances of time…or for 
nuances of place. Perhaps his most glaring deficiency, however, was an 
unwillingness to distinguish rhetoric from reality. For Foucault, motive mattered 
more than practice.147 
 
 It is interesting to observe the approaches of the two in analyzing history. As 
Rothman points out, Foucault’s explanation of the historic figures or historical events are 
limited, omitting the historical and geographical temporalities. However, the discourse of 
Foucault captures a poetic quality that invokes the fantastic imagery of Hieronymus 
Bosch’s the Ship of Fools and Francisco de Goya’s the Mad House, providing a 
tremendously imaginative work to readers interested in the history of madness. 
 A British historian, Roy Porter also criticized Foucault’s explanation of "great 
confinement" as "simplistic and over-generalized," ignoring the subtlety of time and 
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geography.148 In contrast to the centralized operation of the seventeenth century French 
asylum, Porter explained how other European countries like Russia and England did not 
have systematized, publicly funded asylums until the nineteenth century. Porter also 
questioned Foucault’s argument that moral therapy installed a bourgeois work ethic in 
patients. Porter found little trace of organized labor in the early asylum. On the contrary, 
those asylums were often criticized as “dens of idleness.”149  
 In addition, Porter found Foucault’s premise that the insane asylum functioned as 
a milieu of social control too simplistic. For Porter, the asylum was not an apparatus to 
instill the work ethic of burgeoning industrial society. Instead, it was the "site of myriad 
negotiations of wants, rights, and responsibilities, between diverse parties in a mixed 
consumer economy with a burgeoning service sector."150 
 However, the major function of Foucault’s work was not to describe historic 
events and practices with precise accuracy. Scottish psychiatrist, R. D. Laing acclaimed 
his work as an exceptional book that challenged the “assumptions of transitional 
psychiatry.” Foucault’s role was to provide a new intellectual framework to the history of 
madness and civilization. 151 For the proponents of anti-psychiatry, the function of 
Foucault’s work was not to look at twentieth century psychiatry as an unchanging 
practice based on absolute truth but to interrogate such a premise by looking how modern 
psychiatry, like any other social institution,  had been influenced by the temporality of 
thought, knowledge, and practice.  
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R. D. Laing 
 Published in 1967, R. D. Laing argued that the fragmentation and alienation of 
modern human beings was caused by their dismissal of “experience” in the Politics of 
Experience. As he was interested in the growing influence of Zen on the domain of 
psychotherapy, the piece was dotted with mysterious Zen conundrum-like discourse: 
“The common bond between Us may be the Other,” “We are They to Them as They are 
shadows of each other.” 152 Such cryptic phrases dotted the entire book. His imagery was 
influenced by psychotropic agents. After his initial LSD trip in 1961, he provided his 
clients with the substance for therapeutic purposes.153 In the book, he attempted to 
distinguish between experience and behavior as between inner and outer, or between 
imagination and perception. Laing showed a concern for modern society where people’s 
inner experience, which used to be called the “Soul,” was alienated.154 The rich landscape 
of dream-like fantasy was the farthest place where a “normal” mind could reach, but he 
was afraid that alienation of experience led to the damnation of intimate fantasy. Laing 
argued: “If you do not know the boundary of fantasy, how would you know where to find 
“‘pathological’ zones of hallucination, phantasmagoric mirages, delusions?”155  Fantasy 
was a way one could relate to the inner experience and the world.156 He also questioned 
the limitation of psychology: “How could one ever study the experience of the other?” 
He continued: “Natural science knows nothing of the relation between behavior and 
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experience.”157 Since one’s experience was in the domain of inner milieu, no other person 
could see through the subjective experience that was only observable through a person’s 
behavior. “My experience of you is always mediated through your behavior,” Laing 
explained.158  
 In terms of alienation of genuine relationship and the slight of authentic 
communication between the two, Laing also criticized the concept of modern family. 
Laing regarded family as merely a machine for creating a one-dimensional man.159 For 
him, family was the unit where brainwashing was carried out. Family was where children 
could be “indoctrinated” to society so that they could adapt to a wider society. Hence, 
Laing showed a strong resentment towards the expected role of modern families as the 
smallest unit of society where children could learn how to adapt to the wider society: 
“Adaptation to what? To society? To a world gone mad?”160 “Whether it is the exposure 
to sham, the spatialization and quantification of experience or the massive economic 
irrationality of the whole system,” he believed the late 1960’s was a highly fragmentized 
and alienated society.161 He would have referred to the source of alienation from the 
postwar social structure in terms of a change where a nuclear family became the norm of 
society. 
 Laing celebrated the intimacy of a therapist and a patient in the therapeutic 
process where the patient could understand the relationship between the two persons. The 
patient regained the context between experience and behavior within the “relevant 
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contextual social systems.”162 Hence he showed a rejection of Freud’s “metapsychology” 
where there was a lack of language in explaining relations. Laing deemed the awareness 
of relation as the essential process. Where Freud objectified the system of therapy; Laing 
attempted to “see man as an object of natural scientific investigation.”163 Laing further 
extended the criticism to Behavior therapy, despising the method as a “technique of non-
meeting, of manipulation and control,” simply repressing the mere symptom of the 
illness.164  
 In the Politics of Experience, Laing explicitly showed his hatred towards behavior 
therapy, mentioning the depersonalizing aspect of Freud’s psychotherapy where he 
recognized the lack of phrases in explaining interpersonal relation in Freud’s theory. 
Laing carried his analysis over to game theory, objective-relations theory, and 
transactional electronic systems, summarizing them as a dangerous analogy where man 
and machine were analyzed in the same tableau. As he extended his concerns to behavior 
therapy, stating that it was based on “schizoid theory,” derogating the mechanical nature 
of the therapy as a replication of behavior without experience. Laing believed that 
behavior therapy sabotaged building a relationship between a therapist and a patient. It 
was an anti-therapy, a mere “technique” that simply masked the root of alienation.165 In 
such a mechanical relationship, the patient felt detached from or even became unaware of 
his/ her innermost feelings. By boiling down the explanation of human behavior to the 
level of environmental stimuli, the experience was placed out of context, cast into 
oblivion. The core of experience, or as Laing would put it, the Soul, became a Pandora’s 
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Box that nobody, even the “owner” of the box, should look at. If behavior was detached 
from the subjective experience of feelings and emotions, how would it even be possible 
to place one’s inner experience: sadness, anger, joy, creativity, desire, and pleasure into a 
relationship between “I” and “you”?   
 Herbert Marcuse’s seminal work, One-Dimensional Man touched upon the 
political implications of a therapeutic enterprise where the cognitive function of human 
behavior was placed on the center stage of treatment. For Marcuse, a therapist’s office 
was a factory that cranked up the well adjusted one-dimensional man. The existential 
reason of such a man was to satisfy the operational needs provided by the prevailing 
system, in Marcuse’s argument, the advanced industrial society. Advertisements 
guaranteed that satisfying such operational needs was equivalent to self-fulfillment, 
hence the satisfaction of such needs signaled one’s liberty. Marcuse argued that 
“economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy--from being controlled by 
economic forces and relationships; freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from 
earning a living.”166 On the other hand, in a society where economic freedom meant “free 
choice between brands and gadgets,” the commercialized pleasure was a tool for mass 
submission.167 
 For Marcuse and Laing, the seemingly non-political, scientific therapeutic 
enterprise was indeed the political machinery that produced a well greased one-
dimensional man. Apparently benevolent help to acclimate one’s patients to their 
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surrounding by observing and then modifying behaviors deterred one’s capacity to 
question those surroundings: 
(C)ognitive concepts transcend all operational context, but their transcendence is 
empirical because it renders the facts recognizable as that which they really are... 
 
Where these reduced concepts govern the analysis of the human reality, individual 
or social, mental or material, they arrive at a false concreteness--a concreteness 
isolated from the conditions which constitutes its reality. In this context, the 
operational treatment of the concept assumes a political function. The individual 
and his behavior are analyzed in a therapeutic sense--adjustment to his society. 
Thought and expression, theory and practice are to be brought in line with the 
facts of his existence without leaving room for the conceptual critique of those 
facts.168 
 
In an environment where the analysis of cognizable behavior satisfied the pursuit of 
human reality, one’s treatment progress was measured by his/ her adjustment to society. 
A questioning attitude towards the surrounding environment became sidelined. In the 
Unites States, humanistic and existential psychologists like Rollo May also criticized the 
one-dimensional aspect of behaviorism, encouraging his clients to explore beyond the 
operational goal they or a therapist thought they ought to reach: 
...the lack of an adequate concept of the nature of man has made the definition of 
health inevitably empty, and into that vacuum rush such imposters as “adjustment,” 
“fitting in,” “according one's self with the realities of the society,” and so on. This 
tendency, I believe, increases radically with the recent emergence of “operant 
conditioning” forms of psychotherapy which are based on an outspoken denial of 
any need for a theory of man at all beyond the therapist's assumption that 
whatever goals he himself and his society have chosen are the best for all possible 
men.169  
 
 In response to modern psychology’s fixation with “adjustment,” Martin Luther 
King, Jr., posed a concept called “creative maladjustment” in a 1963 speech. He 
envisioned creating The International Association for the Advancement of Creative 
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Maladjustment where the maladjusted men and women would be like the prophet Amos. 
Modern psychology, particularly child psychology blared the importance of being 
adjusted as early as possible in one’s life. But you need to question, King asked the 
audience, do you want to be adjusted to a society where injustice is the norm?   
…there are certain things in our nation and in the world which I am proud to be 
maladjusted and which I hope all men of good‐will will be maladjusted until the 
good societies realize. I say very honestly that I never intend to become adjusted 
to segregation and discrimination. I never intend to become adjusted to religious 
bigotry. I never intend to adjust myself to economic conditions that will take 
necessities from the many to give luxuries to the few. I never intend to adjust 
myself to the madness of militarism, to self‐defeating effects of physical 
violence…170 
 
 Laing, Marcuse, May, and King’s angst towards the creation of the well-adjusted 
individual represented what was happening in the 1960’s. A military psychiatrist named 
Lloyd Cotter carried out a behavioral experiment on schizophrenic patients and autistic 
children in the Bien Hoa Hospital in South Vietnam. Using a technique invented by a 
Behaviorist B. F. Skinner, the aim of the therapy was to modify the unfavorable behavior 
of a subject through “positive” and “negative” stimuli using “conditioning.” According to 
a news report in 1967, some patients who were associated with undesirable behavior were 
deprived of food for days. Cotter administered ECT without anesthetics or muscle 
relaxants, something which had been illegal in the US. While Cotter claimed the 
treatment was beneficial, the news reports of the hospital treatment served as proof of the 
“US imperialist cause in Southeast Asia.”171 
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 Concerning schizophrenia and the experience of psychosis, R. D. Laing analyzed 
the label of schizophrenia as something that was pinned on other people “under certain 
social circumstances.”172  He believed the cause of schizophrenia relied on the social 
context where the patient was placed. His reference to the work of anti-psychiatry fellow, 
Erving Goffman was particularly compelling in confirming Laing’s statement. An 
American sociologist, Goffman argued there was no clear cut line between sanity and 
insanity. Working as an assistant physical therapist at a psychiatric hospital in 
Washington DC, he introduced the concept “total institution” where a patient was 
regarded “as a non agent, as a non-responsible object.”173 Published in 1961, Goffman’s 
book Asylums explained how patients’ behavior was analyzed out of context in order to 
prove their “pathologic” behavior; in the asylum, if a frustrated patient banged chairs to 
show his/ her rejection of the institution, the workers simply defined the person as having 
a psychotic symptom.174 In discussing schizophrenic experience, Laing suggested a 
connection with an initiation ceremony. Instead of stopping his/her “voyage” to their 
inner world by “treatment,” Laing argued there should be “a natural way of healing our 
own appalling state of alienation called normality.”175 This transcendental experience 
could be a breakthrough for a patient, not a breakdown.176  As a psychiatrist, Laing must 
have pictured himself as a guide or shaman in assisting patients through an initiation 
experience.  
   Critics of Laing pointed out that he romanticized psychosis as a transcendental 
experience, while weaving a “psycho-political” message into a person’s “mental 
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misery.”177 Based on his experience in a hippy commune in British Columbia and 
subsequent hospitalization with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, Mark Vonnegut published 
his autobiography The Eden Express: A Memoir of Insanity in 1975. A son of the 
counter-culture writer Kurt Vonnegut, Vonnegut had been a fervent follower of R. D. 
Laing and Thomas Szasz. However, his disillusion towards such radical psychiatrists hit 
him during the hospitalization. Prior to the publication of The Eden Express, he wrote an 
article titled “Why I Want to Bite R. D. Laing,” explaining how he became disillusioned 
with Laing while he was committed to a hospital for schizophrenia in 1971: 
He's said so many nice things about us: we're the only sane members of an insane 
society, our insights are profound and right on, we're prophetic, courageous 
explorers of inner space, and so forth... But what I felt when I found myself 
staring out of the little hole in the padded cell was betrayal. I did everything just 
like you said, and look where I am now, you bastard.178 
 
Laing’s “Madness need not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough” became a 
slogan of the counter-culture but at the same time the phrase went out of his control.179 
To experience the “breakthrough,” some took LSD to induce hallucinations; Judi 
Chamberlin’s colleague Sandra Ruffner argued that Mark Vonnegut was one of the Laing 
devotees who “believed in one popular interpretation of R. D. Laing’s book The Politics 
of Experience.”180   
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 The romanticized interpretation of mental illness in The Politics of Experience 
had serious implications for people with the diagnosis of schizophrenia.181 In response to 
Chamberlin’s review of The Eden Express that criticized Vonnegut as a “good mental 
patient,” Vonnegut fiercely refuted Chamberlain’s biting remarks: “There are a number 
of exceptionally cheap shots that make me just want to say ‘fuck you.’”182 He thought 
popular scholastic arguments about madness—that mental illness was a myth (Szasz) or 
that it was a natural reaction to the unjust society (Laing)--were self-perpetuating tools 
tinged with whatever political camps they were in:   
I feel that most psychiatrists should be taken out and shot. Szasz and Laing 
included. I’m fed to the teeth with theoriticians [sic] of all stripes and colours 
using mental illness and mental patients to push their own theories and prestiege 
[sic]. Everyone’s swarming to whatever theory they find congenial. No one or 
damn near no one gives a damn about what really helps people.183 
 
While her rebuttal was fierce, Chamberlin agreed with Vonnegut about Laing’s 
romanticization of madness: “madness (or whatever) is not a romantic adventure. It 
hurts.”184  
As the advocator of a patient-run alternative to psychiatry, Chamberlin also had a “real 
quarrel” with Laing’s position as a psychiatrist. In the Laingian therapeutic environment, 
no matter how anti-authoritarian the psychiatrist was, the role of a “psychiatrist” and a 
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“schizophrenic” was rigidly fixed. Chamberlin thought such fixed roles did not create a 
mutual, equal place for support, understanding, and healing.   
Thomas Szasz 
 Foucault found the coercive, moralistic roots of asylums in the trinity of policing, 
church, and judicial power through philosophical inquiry. As a radical, alternative 
psychiatrist, Laing drew an idealized therapeutic environment by portraying himself as a 
modern-day shaman. In contrast to those left-leaning scholars who became iconic figures 
of the counterculture, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz approached the politics of involuntary 
commitment from the medico-judicial perspective. On the grounds of castigating the 
systematic control of one’s liberty, Szasz, a civil libertarian, divulged the relationship 
between judiciary and psychiatric systems, gaining support from populist and intellectual 
audiences.185 In his influential book The Myth of Mental Illness published in 1961, Szasz 
declared: “I am opposed, on moral and political grounds, to all psychiatric interventions 
which are involuntary; and, on personal grounds, to all such interventions which curtail 
the client’s autonomy.”186 For ex-patients in the 1970’s, Szasz was the most influential 
scholar working on behalf of patients’ rights. Claiming that those who were regarded as 
“mad” were in fact nonconformists who could not play the game of societal status-quo, 
his argument was readily adopted by a wide-range of activists.  
 As a libertarian, Szasz castigated the liaison between the state and psychiatry, 
arguing that the former was corrupting psychiatry. The government seized on psychiatry 
as a tool of social control, legitimizing coerced treatment upon people who were labeled 
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as mentally ill. Szasz argued that since there was no visible brain lesion, schizophrenia’s 
classification as a disease was a “fiction perpetrated by organized psychiatry to gain 
power.”187  
 While Szasz argued mental illness was a myth propelled by psychiatry, he also 
believed that people who were perceived as mentally ill were either consciously or 
unconsciously playing a “strategy for evading responsibility and/ or exercising power in 
the games of interpersonal interactions.”188 In Being Mentally Ill, Scheff focused on the 
involuntary aspect of such role-playing.189 Goffman sympathetically observed how 
hospital inmates were committed due to social factors, but Szasz simplistically 
interpreted mental illness as a strategy for helping patients avoid responsibility. He was 
obsessed with the idea of “personal responsibility.” For example, he interpreted the 
popularity of the insanity defense from the 1950s onwards as a medical game where 
patients – or “malingerers” as he called them – essentially exploited the psychiatric and 
judicial systems for their own ends.190   
 The scholars in the early 1960’s anti-psychiatry movement brought the discussion 
of madness and of the psychiatric system to the table of political and philosophical 
discussion. Foucault and Laing argued from the left-leaning standpoint, while Szasz did 
so from the libertarian point of view. The theories of these scholars became a highly 
charged philosophical and political debate over man’s search for meaning. On the other 
hand, ex-patients’ reactions to these arguments varied, creating controversial discussion 
within the community.    
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Conference on Human Rights and Psychiatric Oppression 
  At the end of 1975, Chamberlin moved from Bellingham, Washington to Boston 
to join the Mental Patients Liberation Front (MPLF). She would later call the MPLF “the 
purest, clear, radical group.” 191 Many of the original members were from the political left 
who had been engaged with other civil rights movements. The name, the Mental Patient 
Liberation Front resembled the National Liberation Front of Vietnam. “It was meant to 
shock, it was meant to get people’s attention,” Chamberlin later explained in her 
interview.192  The organization had a practical, effective strategy backed up with the 
philosophy of the civil rights movement. When Chamberlin joined the group, they were 
focusing on in-hospital organizing by distributing a booklet called Your Rights as a 
Mental Patient in Massachusetts to the patients in state hospitals. In the mid 1970’s, the 
MPLF focused on organizing at Boston State Hospital. Once a week, the members and 
the hospital patients met in the hospital to discuss patient rights. A volunteer at the 
hospital invited the MPLF members to be guest speakers at a “current event group.” 
Since the patients wanted to talk about their rights as a current event, the MPLF members 
were able to organize the group for months without administrators being aware of their 
activity. Once the hospital stuff noticed the presence of the MPLF members, they were 
asked to leave, but the patients were able to invite them back by organizing a petition.193 
Allied with the Greater Boston Legal Services, the MPLF also assisted with multiple 
lawsuits regarding forced medication and seclusion.194  
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 Volunteers were a medium between the activists and patients. When guards at 
Bridgewater State Hospital discovered that a volunteer teacher was distributing the 
MPLF pamphlet, they regarded the group as “outside agitators,” with one guard showing 
his disgust by saying that “sick puppies here don’t need this shit.”195 As evidenced by the 
guard’s strong reaction, the pamphlet was a powerful tool for making the patients’ voices 
heard in a difficult situation. The handbook aimed to protect patients’ rights by showing 
them how to navigate through the judicial system if they were involuntarily committed. 
The handbook gave direct, practical advice. For example, in the section titled Civil 
Commitment, the MPLF advised patients: “Remember, the judge will be influenced by 
your appearance and attitude. Try to look your best. If you wear your own clothes, you 
will look less like a ‘mental patient’ than if you show up in hospital pajamas.”196  
 Since 1973, ex-patients groups in North America had been organizing a national 
level conference every summer. The first conference was held at the University of 
Michigan. Organized by a psychologist and the Mental Patient Liberation Project 
(MPLP), the conference agreed that an ex-patient led model of recovery was necessary 
for their liberation.197 Chamberlin did not attend the first conference, but after the second 
conference held in Topeka, Kansas, she attended almost all the conferences until the 
conferences ceased in 1985. 
 Fifty-one “psychiatric inmate organizations” joined the 1974 Kansas conference. 
From England, the Philadelphia Association which had operated R. D. Laing’s Kingsley 
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Hall joined. Groups from Canada, New Zealand, and France also joined the conference 
held in a campground.198 The participants marched at Topeka State Hospital; the rallying 
became a custom for the conference participants.199 The third conference was held in San 
Francisco in July 1975. Sponsored by the Network Against Psychiatric Assault (NAPA), 
the conference was attended by “former mental patients, activists in patients’ rights and 
anti-psychiatry organizations, workers in Bay Area ‘alternative’ therapies, other ‘mental 
health’ professionals, including a few practicing psychiatrists, and considerable number 
of the concerned and merely curious.”200 The conference was held at the International 
Museum of Erotic Art in the downtown area.201  
 The rallying target for the third conference was St Mary’s Hospital where the 
NAPA members had carried out a series of investigations revealing the forced treatments 
at their McAuley Neuropsychiatric Institute.  An anonymous registered nurse who had 
worked at the institute testified that “(t)he place is like a prison and I felt more like a 
warden than a person who was there to help.”202 When Laura Grandin was hospitalized at 
the institute, she went through so called “harassment therapy” to “mobilize her anger.” 
The first program was to scrub the outline of a linoleum square block on the floor with a 
toothbrush counter clockwise from seven in the morning to eleven in the evening. When 
the first regimen of the therapy was deemed a failure, her cleaning task became more 
unpleasant and Spartan; the rules became more and more cryptic. Another task was to 
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memorize a book about the life of Theodore Roosevelt words by words, including 
punctuation.203  
 Another “treatment” was “sheeting.” By wrapping a patient tightly with seven 
sheets, he/ she was immobilized and then strapped to a bed. David Paul, a McAuley staff 
person testified for the NAPA that sheeting was used against disobedient patients. The 
disobedience included hitting a person, screaming, pacing, or refusing staff request to 
take medication.  Sheeting was an “essential deterrent to noncooperation.”204 In August 
1974, one doctor administered a “special sheeting program” by wrapping a patient ten to 
seventeen hours a day for five days. During the five days, he was under a drug induced 
state of sleep. During the sleep therapy, the doctor administered four to eight hundred 
milligram of Thorazine orally to the patients three times a day. The patient was also given 
“generous dosage of Librium, Mellaril, Stelagine, Sodium Amytal, Haldol, Cogentin, and 
Colace.”205 
 In addition to the Electro Convulsive Therapy, the McAuley Neuropsychiatric 
Institute also used the Indoklon Convulsive Therapy (ICT). Introduced by John C. 
Krantz, Jr. in 1957, a volatile liquid substance Indoklon was either inhaled or injected to 
induce convulsion.206 At the institute, the ICT was carried out on an experimental 
basis.207 While she was committed to McAuley, Paula Fine noticed a disproportionate 
number of female patients were subjected to ECT. Before leaving the hospital in 
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December 1973, she checked the past six months’ list of patients of ECT and confirmed 
that many more women had received the treatment than men. Out of seventy-two 
patients, fifty-one were female, which was over seventy percent.208  
 On Friday, July 4th, the participants of the conference rallied and marched around 
St Mary’s Hospital.  Starting at Union Square in downtown San Francisco, the march 
walked for over three miles chanting, “What do you want? FREEDOM! When do you 
want it? NOW!!” “Two, four, six, eight. Smash the therapeutic state.” “Join us – it could 
happen to you.” 209 At the hospital, the San Francisco police force was guarding the 
hospital property because the NAPA members had successfully entered a locked ward 
before. Because of the police order to remain quiet in a hospital zone, the marchers 
decided to rally on the sidewalk outside. While they were not sure their chants could 
reach the patients in the locked wards, they chanted a “message of support,” and repeated 
the NAPA’s telephone number so the patients could later contact the NAPA. They ended 
the march by singing We Shall Overcome.210  
 During the San Francisco conference, Chamberlin became more and more aware 
of the division between mental health professionals and ex-patients. While those 
professionals were well intentioned people who wanted to improve the condition mental 
patients were under, Chamberlin could not bear their controlling attitude masked under 
benevolent intentions. At the conference, the mental health professionals were trying to 
pacify the ex-patients’ anger that came from their experience of forced treatments, 
drugging, and seclusion. As a result, Chamberlin felt those well intentioned professionals 
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were trying to discredit her feelings and opinions. For the professionals, ex-patient anger 
was something to be checked and controlled. In fact, this desire to control ex-patient 
anger was a prime source of the ex-patients’ anger. Chamberlin and her colleagues’ saw 
it as a matter of human rights:  
The whole idea of “objectivity” is an example of the elitist professionalism that 
pervaded so much of the Conference. The result of enshrining objectivity as a 
prime virtue was to deemphasize and discredit the passion and anger of those 
Conference participants who live with the consequences of psychiatric oppression 
every day of our lives–former psychiatric inmates. Our individual expression of 
anger and dissatisfaction were put down by some of the professionals present 
(supposedly our “allies”)…211 
 
Chamberlin was sick and tired of being discredited as an unreliable narrator of her own 
experience. Like anyone else, she was an expert of her own experience. Why did 
professionals discredit her experience? This was a decisive moment for her realizing that 
ex-patients needed an alternative system run completely on their own.  
 At the end of the 1975 conference, Chamberlin and her colleagues set up an ex-
inmates’ Caucus. The next conference in 1976 would be held in Boston sponsored by the 
Mental Patients Liberation Front. In December 1975, Chamberlin moved from 
Bellingham, Washington to join the MPLF. 212 The Caucus’s decision for the Boston 
conference was to divide the four-day conference into two sections: the first two days 
were exclusively for current and former “psychiatric inmates” and non-professional, non 
ex-patients who were active in the movement. The workshops on those days focused on 
“theory and practice in the mental patients liberation movement.”213 The rest of the two 
days was open to the general public, which included mental health professionals. The 
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workshops on those days were geared towards educating the general public. All the 
workshops were decided on the first day of the conference. Prior to the conference, 
workshop topics were “suggested”; those topics included “Relating to the Prisoners’ 
Movement,” “Working with Liberals,” “How to Talk Back to Your Shrink,” and “How to 
Get Off Drugs.”214  
 On a late May weekend, the conference was held in Tufts University. Just as the 
previous conference in San Francisco marched around St. Mary’s Hospital, the Boston 
conference targeted the Massachusetts Mental Health Center and the Harvard Medical 
School. They considered the former “as a symbol of psychiatric oppression” and the latter 
“as a symbol of the ruling institutions in this country, which put wealth, property, and 
power above the basic needs of human beings.”215 With signs bearing the slogans “Smash 
Psychiatric Oppression!!!” and “I am the Expert of My Own Head,” over a hundred 
people rallied in front of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center.216 At the entrance, 
they chanted “Patients united will never be defeated.”217 While the demonstrators were 
exchanging words with hospital psychiatrists and the police, a woman on the third floor 
seclusion room called to them: “If I had a chance, I’d take my own life…because they’ve 
treated me so bad I’m not worth two cents.” The patient, Selma was in the seclusion room 
so long that she wanted to call her daughter. She was also unable to go to the 
bathroom:218   
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I remember a bunch of the Mass. Mental staff were gathered blocking the door, 
like they were afraid we were going to storm the place. And the patients were able 
to look out the window and see us. We were having conversations with them, 
yelling back and forth, and there was this one woman who was in a seclusion 
room, yelling out the window to us that she had been yelling for the staff to come 
unlock the door so she could go to the bathroom. And so we began chanting: “Let 
Selma go to the bathroom! Let Selma go to the bathroom!” 
 
It was really a very exciting moment, because it all comes down to these very 
simple issues of human dignity.219 
 
 By the mid 1970’s, the ex-patients were rapidly gaining legitimacy for their 
collective voice. The ex-patient activists had learned tactics to organize their own civil 
rights movement by joining their predecessors in other human rights movements. By the 
mid 1960’s, the scholarly discussion of the social context of madness gained legitimacy 
not only in academia but also with the public. Based on those intellectual discussions, the 
emergence of patients rights’ organizations in the early 1970’s gained a political 
legitimacy, able to disclose the inhumane nature of forced treatment and to win over the 
general public through their own testimonies. In the next chapter, I would like to discuss 
how the psychiatric survivors movement after 1976 faced challenges posed by the 
prevalence of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III) and the biological explanation of the etiology of mental illness.  
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Chapter 3 
PATIENTS' STORY, SYMPTOM, AND DSM-III 
One by one various clinicians approached me starting with the doctor in charge, 
and gradually working their way down in the ladder. Each fired a series of 
questions at me. Each seemed little concerned with who I really was inside; they 
just seemed intent on getting their questions and I remained silent. They sat me in 
a wheelchair and wheeled me over to a corner, while they decided what to do next. 
Meanwhile a young corpsman, the lowest ranking “clinician” in the emergency 
room, stopped over to see me. He looked at me in a caring, focused manner. It 
was clear in his eyes that he cared about the me deep inside. In a very gentle voice 
he then said, “Hi, my name is Rick. I can see that you are in a lot of pain. Could 
you nod your head if you can hear me?” I nodded in affirmation and felt that I 
could return to living with other people.220 
 
-- Daniel B. Fisher, M.D., Ph.D. 
 
While survivors were advocating for an alternative to the medical model based 
explanation and treatment of mental illness in the mid 1970’s, the mental health system 
was also radically transforming itself in a direction ex-patients like Chamberlin did not 
like. Ex-patients were claiming the legitimacy of their voice, but at the same time, 
symptomatology was gaining more power in the process of diagnosis. Robert Spitzer was 
appointed as the chairman for the DSM-III taskforce in 1974, and he aimed to put the 
diagnosis process through a drastic change. Under his system, the etiology of illness-- 
whether caused by biological, genetic, or even social factors--was not a determining 
factor; by excluding the possibility of considering those potential underlying causes, he 
established the system that symptom was the best, and the only, clue to diagnose.221   
However, because virtually all the psychiatrists and other mental health workers in the 
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Unites States used the DSM, the manual became a great supporter of the medical model 
based explanation of the cause of mental illness.  
The discussion about the etiology of madness has been split between the medical 
and the social model explanations. The rise of the anti-psychiatry movement in the 
1960’s invigorated the discussion that people experienced an extreme state of mind 
because the social pressure coaxed them to conform by playing an expected role in their 
community. Rather than trying to adjust to the environment, the proponents of anti-
psychiatry argued, society needed to change.  
However, from the 1980’s onwards, the medical model explanation of madness 
began occupying the discussion about mental health and illness. Michael Staub’s 2011 
book, Madness Is Civilization: When Diagnosis was Social, 1948-1980 explains that this 
medical and social “tug-of-war” has been “unsettled and unresolved.” This cyclical 
argument goes like a see-saw; one side gains legitimacy while the other goes down.222  
The proponents of the medical model argue people suffer from mental illness 
because of the imbalance in the way their brains function. For example, established in 
1979, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) is a patient and patient’s family 
advocacy group which supports the medical model explanation of mental illness: “A 
mental illness is a medical condition that disrupts a person's thinking, feeling, mood, 
ability to relate to others and daily functioning. Just as diabetes is a disorder of the 
pancreas, mental illnesses are medical conditions that often result in a diminished 
capacity for coping with the ordinary demands of life.”223 As a person with Diabetes 
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mellitus type 1 needs insulin to sustain his/ her life, the NAMI states a person with 
serious mental illness--“major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
borderline personality disorder”-- can recover by the help of pharmacological 
solutions.224 
In this chapter, I will explain how the medical model explanation of mental illness 
gained legitimacy by explaining the Rosenhan Experiment in 1974 and the subsequent 
conception of the DSM-III in 1980. To illustrate how the DSM-III tried to gain scientific 
legitimacy, I look at the works of Sigmund Freud for psychoanalysis, Robert Spitzer for 
the DSM-III, and B. F. Skinner for Behaviorism. I will then continue explaining how the 
arguments by the social and medical model camps were affected by the federally led de-
institutionalization programs. I end this chapter by illustrating how Judi Chamberlain 
found a wider support from the cross-disability advocacy movement in the midst of the 
prevalence of the medical model based explanation. 
Biological Model vs Social Model: DSM-III and Rosenhan Experiment 
In comprising the DSM-III, there was a reason why Spitzer’s radical approach in 
diagnosis was deemed necessary by psychiatry. A year prior to Spitzer’s appointment, a 
psychologist, D. L. Rosenhan published an article called “On Being Sane in Insane 
Places,” and the American Psychiatric Association fell under serious criticism over the 
legitimacy of its diagnoses. In his experiment, Rosenhan sent eight “sane” people to 
twelve psychiatric institutions. The pseudo-patients complained “they had been hearing 
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voices” and were admitted to psychiatric wards.225 Aside from one of the pseudo-patients, 
all the rest were diagnosed with schizophrenia and discharged from the hospital less than 
a few months after because their symptoms were determined to be “in remission.”226  
Rosenhan argued that the label of schizophrenia had a social resonance; once the 
label of schizophrenia was applied, the person lost his/ her identity as a human being: 
“Once the impression has been formed that the patient is schizophrenic, the expectation is 
that he will continue to be schizophrenic.”227 An example of this was Chamberlin’s 
experience in losing the custody of her child due to her psychiatric record. The label took 
on its own life, taking over one’s personality. Based on the result of his experiment, 
Rosenhan’s article concluded that only a very few mental health professionals are willing 
to know about the experience of their former patients possibly because “they distrust 
information coming from the previously insane.”228  Rosenhan questioned the validity of 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia because of the mental professionals’ unwillingness to 
learn from the experiential narrative of their patients. In this way, the treatment of mental 
illness can be compared to the way that the behavior of pre-lingual children falls under a 
physiological explanation where the narrative of the children’s inner experiences is not a 
factor for consideration in treatment.229 Effectively, caregivers treat patients’ narratives of 
their inner experiences as equivalent to the gibberish of young children.  
The result of Rosenhan’s “prank” exceeded his expectations. After the result of 
the experiment went public, he announced to the hospitals staff that he was going to send 
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more pseudopatients to gain admittance. In order to outwit Rosenhan’s scheme, they 
diagnosed dozens as prank, despite the fact that Rosenhan had not sent any additional 
pseudopatients.230  
A more shocking result for Rosenhan was that many pseudopatients reported to 
him that they felt as if they were “going crazy” while being admitted to the asylums. 
Some told “how life on a mental ward damaged their self-worth. Some became anxious, 
wondering how they had managed so effortlessly to be admitted to a mental hospital.”231 
 The Rosenhan Experiment questioned the subjectivity of diagnosis. Rosenhan and 
his pseudopatients demonstrated how just entering the asylum with a fabricated mental 
distress warranted the person needed treatment. Because of the question that arose from 
the Rosenhan experiment over the subjectivity of diagnosis, Spitzer in the DSM-III 
taskforce paid particular attention in achieving a systematized, streamlined diagnostic 
process. He skillfully used Rosenhan’s work to deconstruct the conventional diagnosis 
process. While he disregarded the Rosenhan Experiment as “junk,” it was a convincing 
tool to justify why psychiatry needed a radical reform.232 To undermine the works of anti-
psychiatry, the DSM taskforce paid particular attention to arrive at a systematic, objective 
diagnostic criteria. The arrival of the DSM-III in 1980 further propelled the notion, 
deeming the source of mental illness as one’s biochemical irregularity.233  
 Laura Hirshbein’s 2009 book, American Melancholy: Construction of Depression 
in the Twentieth Century explains how the increase in diagnosis of depression in recent 
decades from the persepective of a practicing clinical psychiatrist. She chronicles how the 
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diagnosis of depression has expanded in the last decades due to the expansion of the 
definition of clinical depression and the increased availability of commercialized 
solutions to one’s mental distress. The increase in the number of diagnoses has been not 
only influenced by aggressive marketing tactics by pharmaceutical companies but also by 
psychiatrists’ interest in a certain mode of professional conduct.234 In order to achieve the 
objective of having all psychiatrists arrive at the same diagnosis, Spitzer categorized 
disorders by observable symptoms.235 Psychiatrists in the 1980’s adopted Spitzer’s stance 
on the validity of symptoms in diagnosis. For example, in treating depression, they 
“assumed that symptoms were more valuable than stories to compare patients and their 
treatments.” They underestimated “the value of human interactions in their reduction of 
stories to statistical data.”236 While ex-patients advocates were claiming the legitimacy of 
their experiential narrative, more and more patients who believed that depression was like 
the “common cold” of mind welcomed the quick “symptom-based criteria and 
checklists.”237 
In Search of Scientific Explanation of the Human Mind 
As scientific disciplines, psychiatry and psychology are meant to view human 
behavior with objectivity. However the path to objectivity is not a natural course. In order 
to gain the reputation of objectivity, Sigmund Freud as a psychologist, Robert Spitzer as a 
psychiatrist, and B. F. Skinner as a psychologist/ behaviorist intentionally removed the 
social and cultural contexts from their analysis. In order to establish the self-evident 
explanation and diagnosis of their mental illness, they thought the socio-cultural factors 
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were subjective, hence unscientific variables.  Freud did so in order to prove the ubiquity 
of the unconscious in human behavior. Spitzer similarly omitted these contexts in order to 
provide standardized diagnostic criteria.  B. F. Skinner deducted the socio-cultural human 
conduct as a “response” to “contingencies.”       
Sigmund Freud 
 In Civilization and Its Discontents published in German in 1930, Freud argued 
that civilization imposes conflict between the person’s ego and society. When “the 
boundary lines between the ego and the external world become uncertain or … they are 
actually drawn incorrectly,” the person enters a pathological state of mind.238 When we 
confront “the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies and the 
inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in 
the family, the state and society,” one becomes neurotic.239 Freud determined that a 
“civilized” person enters a pathological state when he has confronted the third criteria of 
suffering; the uncertain boundary line between private (the ego) and public (society).   
 Published in 1953 and 1956 respectively, a sociologist Philip Rieff wrote “History, 
Psychology, and the Social Sciences” and “The Origins of Freud’s Political Psychology” 
during his eight year marriage with Susan Sontag.240  In “History, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Social Sciences,” Rieff explains Freud’s therapeutic use of analogy in human illness. 
Freud used analogy not only to provide explanation for one’s psychological processes but 
also for society, history, religion, art, and politics.241 Under his theory, the relationship 
between private and public are nullified since the sickness of an individual is the sickness 
                                                          
238
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961)., 33-34. 
239
 Ibid., 33. 
240
 Robert McFadden, “Philip Rieff, Sociologist and Author on Freud, Dies at 83,” New York Times, July 4, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/04/us/04rieff.html#. 
241
 Philip Rieff, “History, Psychoanalysis, and the Social Sciences,” Ethics 63, no. 2 (1953): 108. 
 76 
of society. Freud devalued the social and historical context of an individual’s illness in 
order to provide an objective explanation of the subject’s psychological process. 
Therefore, Freud regarded a human being as a passive carrier of the unconscious, 
unaffected by the temporality of time and space. Rieff argues that because Freud was 
“aware that history could proceed outside the consciousness of its actors,” he disregarded 
the meaning of human actions.242  
 In “The Origins of Freud’s Political Psychology,” Rieff explains Freud’s attempt 
at analyzing politics through psychology. Freud’s pathological gaze on the masses began 
germinating during his visit to Paris in 1885 where the memories of the Revolution and 
the Commune were still fresh. Borrowing the ideas from Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd 
published in 1895, he believed that the unconscious revealed itself when the individual 
lost his/ herself in the crowd, and that the unconscious was “an inaccessible madhouse of 
desire” that belonged to “the revolutionary mob.” 243 Through the explanation of 
unconsciousness, Freud analyzed the psychology of “being ruled” without historical 
reference.244 Because of its vulnerability to manipulation and agitation, he deemed mass 
behavior as open to the influence of “suggestion.” On the other hand, Freud actively used 
“hypnosis” as a therapeutic tool. However, through the practice, he began to distance 
himself from hypnotic technique since he came to see it as “the art of being ruled.”245  
 Freud’s discomfort towards the ruthless mob comes from his theory that 
civilization represses one’s aggression. As a result, the person’s aggression becomes 
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“introjected, internalized.”246 One’s conscience (which he calls the super-ego) plants the 
sense of guilt to repress the person's aggressive impulse, thus creating the sense of 
anxiety.247 Humanity’s destructive instinct is held at bay because of his conscience, but 
what if he places himself in the crowd, the space where people enter the state of high 
suggestibility? Freud was afraid of the moment when humanity’s repressed aggression 
turned to the destructive ruthless mob mentality. 
B. F. Skinner 
 While post-war anti-psychiatry scholars such as Michel Foucault, R. D. Laing, 
and Thomas Szasz discussed the relationship between madness and society from the 
context of philosophical, psycho-political, and medico-judicial discourses, psychologist B. 
F. Skinner endeavored to establish an ideal society where there was no sense of alienation 
or emotional distress by applying his scientific inquiry of behavior. Through the right 
application of the technology of “behavior modification,” Skinner envisioned that a well 
controlled but content society would be realized.248 Along with his predecessors, John 
Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and Edward Thorndike, Skinner’s school of “radical behaviorism” 
became a major force of post-war psychology.249 A professor of psychology at Harvard 
University, Skinner’s Behaviorism was widely employed in a therapeutic setting where 
“getting adjusted” to one’s environment became the synonym of “getting better.” In order 
to transmit the benefit of Behaviorism to the general public, he published a utopian 
fiction, Walden Two in 1948. Through the description of a fictional intentional 
community in Massachusetts, he explained how human behavior was determined by 
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environment, arguing how an ideal, content society like Walden Two could be realized 
through the right application of Behaviorism.  
 In his 1971 Beyond Freedom and Dignity, he boiled down the mechanism of 
human behavior to a “stimulus,” a “response,” and a “reflex.”250 Skinner regarded human 
emotion and feeling as “by-products” of “contingencies” determined by a given 
environment.251 Feelings can provide an “informed guess,” hence subjective, unscientific 
explanation of a certain behavior, but he urged that psychologists should analyze the 
contingencies, a socio-cultural environment codified by its norms and values. He argued 
that psychologists’ preoccupation with analyzing human behavior through “feeling and 
states of mind” was obscuring them from finding a scientific, hence observable and 
empirical explanation of human behavior.252  
 Unlike the assertions of anthropologists, sociologists, and non-behaviorist 
psychologists, the premise of Beyond Freedom and Dignity is that man is not free, 
purposeful, or responsible.253 Skinner pointed out that Freud’s theory is dotted with 
determinism and that Freudian therapists would tell their patients “they are free to choose 
among different courses of action and are in the long run the architects of their own 
destinies.”254 Moreover, Skinner warns those who believe in human potentiality: “The 
escape route is slowly closed as new evidences of the predictability of human behavior 
are discovered.”255 Given that predictability, Skinner argues that man is “better to be 
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controlled.”256 He criticizes that the specialists in social sciences lack scientific insight, 
thus forcing them to view “all control as wrong and to misrepresent many of the 
advantages to be gained from a social environment.”257 “The problem is to free men, not 
from control, but from certain kinds of control, and it can be solved only if our analysis 
takes all consequences into account.”258  
 If we are going to create a well regulated, controlled society, people's behavior 
should be moderated by administering the technique of good reinforcement, Skinner 
proposes.259 The sense of alienation a youth may feel is manifested as a maladaptive 
behavior to his/ her immediate environment. He points out that a youth behaves that way 
because he/ she lacks a positive reinforcement (ie: receiving encouragement) to adapt to a 
new environment or because he/ she has experienced a negative reinforcement in the past. 
However, analyzing or listening to his/ her life story is not a chief concern for Skinner. 
He urges that “we must go directly to the contingencies if we want to be sure, and it is the 
contingencies which must be changed if his behavior is to be changed.”260  
 At Walden Two, the habitants adhere to the Walden Code which controls their 
behavior. While the Code can be changed by a democratic procedure, “if the Code is too 
difficult for anyone or doesn't seem to be working to his advantage, he seeks the help of 
our psychologists. They're our ‘priests’ if you like,” a resident explains.261 Like the 
outside society, an individual’s sense of maladjustment at Walden Two is modified 
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through a psychologist’s intervention. Strong, negative emotions are deemed destructive 
at Walden Two: “The productive and strengthening emotions--joy and love, But sorrow 
and hate--and the high-voltage excitements of anger, fear, and rage--are out of proportion 
with the needs of modern life, and they're wasteful and dangerous.”262 If the Code is 
applied in a democratic way, no adjusted residents should feel excessively frustrated by 
the control.  
 Walden Two is an egalitarian community where the sense of competition is 
unheard of. The people experience no sense of volatile sense of jealousy, fear, and anger. 
The children of Walden Two go through the technology of behavior engineering from the 
moment of their birth. The children develop a tolerance for negative feelings such as 
frustration by slowly having obstacles introduced that fall within the limit that they can 
handle.263  Positive reinforcement “preserves a personal sense of freedom,” free from the 
threat or force from authority.264  
  A question arises; is Walden Two an egalitarian, ideal utopia or a totalitarian 
dystopia where the positivistic and insidious behavior modification technology dictates 
its inhabitants’ behavior?  A popular interpretation of Behaviorism often focuses on the 
negative reinforcement as a tool of brainwashing. A notable case is the depiction of the 
Aversion Therapy where a patient is conditioned to deter a certain behavior by 
associating it with an unpleasant stimulus. A 1962 novella and a subsequent 1971 movie 
Clockwork Orange satirized the Aversion Therapy through the fictional Ludovico 
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Technique where the protagonist Alex’s violent and sexual impulses are neutered by 
associating these sensations with nausea. 
 Skinner argues that in creating a good society, the technology of “behavior 
modification” is essential.265 He reminds us that technology is an “ethically neutral” tool; 
it depends on the holder of the technology.266 For example, if a certain mode of control is 
questionable, countercontrol should naturally regulate the unfair or excessive control. 
Skinner warns when control is occupied by the “organized agencies,” the equilibrium of 
control and countercontrol would be lost. “Hospital for psychotics and homes for 
retardates, orphans, and old people are noted for weak countercontrol, because those who 
are concerned for the welfare of such people often do not know what is happening.”267 As 
Goffman’s Total Institution illustrates, such closed institutions are highly prone to abuse. 
Skinner is aware the possibility of the technology being misused, but he still explains that 
in any circumstances, a man is merely responding to the stimuli from the surrounding 
environment: “The misuse of a technology of behavior is a serious matter, but we can 
guard against it best by looking not at putative controllers but at the contingencies under 
which they control. It is not the benevolence of a controller but the contingencies under 
which he controls benevolently which must be examined.”268  
Robert Spitzer 
 In overseeing the third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), Robert Spitzer worked to create an efficient, systematic diagnostic 
manual comprised of quantitative data. The goal of the manual was to create a set of 
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objective diagnostic criteria where there was no room either for inference or for the 
unconscious bias of practitioners. The first edition of DSM was published in 1952. 
Hirshbein regards the 1980 publication of DSM-III as the moment where depression was 
clinicalized among psychiatrists. The diagnoses of depression increased because DSM-III 
simplified the category of depression into only one: “Major Depressive Episode.”269 
Through the efforts of establishing diagnostic criteria, Spitzer and other American 
psychiatrists such as Alan Stoudemire distanced themselves from psychoanalysis and 
attempted to make their diagnostic criteria out of social and cultural context.270 However, 
DSM-III misses how patients in different social and cultural settings manifest their 
anxiety or depression accordingly. For example, Richard McNally cites the work of 
Arthur Kleinman to explain how Chinese patients focus their somatic presentations of 
depression out of a sense of cultural shame attached to mental illness.271 If a psychiatrist 
does not consider the cultural context particular in China and strictly adheres to the 
guideline of DSM, he/ she may arrive at a different diagnosis than depression. 272 What is 
interesting to note is that Freud also regarded his psychoanalysis theory as devoid of the 
social, cultural, and historical contexts of his subjects.273 Those opposing concepts 
intentionally omitted the social and cultural context of the patients for the sake of 
objective analysis and diagnosis.  
 Because of the simplified diagnostic criteria, depression now has reached the 
point of epidemic; thirty to forty percent of the American population has experienced or 
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will suffer from mental illness in their lifetime. Hirshbein questions whether American 
society is this diseased or whether the definition of mental illness has been absurdly 
expanded.274 She points out the historical contingency of a diagnosis of depression, 
regarding that depression is a product of the recent construction of “social, professional, 
cultural, and gender forces.” 275As the disappearance of homosexuality from “sexual 
deviations” in the DSM-III shows, something that was once thought to be a psychiatric 
illness has been influenced by shifting medical and social practices.276  
 A historian William Sewell explains how a prevalent notion can be socially 
constructed and ingrained in our everyday customs and decision making, to the point of 
causing an out of control situation like the inflated diagnoses of depression:  
Its main analytical thrust is to provide an historical account of how some notion 
was so widely institutionalized, so thoroughly engrained in habit, so built into the 
assumptions, vocabularies, and landscapes of the social constraints and 
mechanism that so frequently bend our actions to ends that we do not seek.277 
 
No matter how much researchers in mental health may regard that their works are based 
on objective, scientific observation, they are not free from their expectations and 
assumptions.278 Hirshbein further argues that their socially structured views on the 
relationship between gender difference and mental illness have caused gender imbalance 
in the diagnosis of depression. 
 Hirshbein questions why modern American women are more pathologized in the 
diagnosis of depression. Modern researchers in the field do not question the “facts” that 
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women are twice as likely to be depressed as men. 279 Research since the late nineteenth 
century has documented women’s vulnerability to such mental illnesses as hysteria, 
involutional melancholia, and depression as their biological destiny. Hormone therapy in 
the 1930’s, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in the late 1940’s, as well as medication 
trials starting from the 1970’s targeted female patients because of their deemed 
susceptibility.280  However, Hirshbein refutes this idea of the greater susceptibility of 
women to depression arguing that these wide-spread “facts” are based on a shaky circular 
concept. In the clinical trials, women are chosen more than men because of this notion, 
and their dominant presence in trials confirms for researchers that women are more 
clinically depressed than men. 281 
 On the other hand, Hirshbein shows her concern for how American women have 
been avid supporters of consumption-oriented solutions to depression.282 Pharmaceutical 
companies use aggressive direct marketing techniques to sell their products. She 
particularly points out the marketing tactics used in promoting Prozac in the late 1980’s 
as “notorious.”283  Popular magazines have been repeatedly promoting the message that 
depression is a disease; it should be monitored and controlled like other physical illnesses 
by urging female readers to be wise consumers. Through the commodification of 
distressed feeling, women in the last few decades are seeking to externalize their causes 
of distress. Thus they choose to be treated with medication.  
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 The researchers in psychiatry have been unwilling to factor race, ethnicity, and 
class into their work because they are hesitant to be involved in heated public arguments. 
Instead, they have regarded sex as a safe, self-evident biological variant.284 The framers 
of the DSM also intentionally excluded social and cultural context from a patient for 
more objective, scientific diagnosis. As xenophobic sentiments prevailed between the late 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century which bolstered the rise of the 
“pseudo-science of racism,” race and class were regarded as subjects better not 
discussed.285 
 By looking at the works of Freud, Skinner, and Spitzer as well as recent critical 
works about them, I illustrated how psychiatrists and psychologist have been concerned 
with objectivity in establishing credibility in their disciplines. It meant they discredited 
the potentially rich experience of human emotions in the healing process and slighted the 
effect of socio-cultural temporality in the way patients exhibit their distress. Freud’s  
pathological gaze on the masses and Skinner’s naïve elitism disregarded an ordinary 
person’s role in determining his/ her life course. Hirshbein and McNally argue the 
diagnosis process according to the DSM is also subject to the socio-cultural conditions 
the patient and clinician are under. The way the patient exhibits symptoms would vary by 
culture or gender, and the way the clinician interprets the supposed symptoms could be 
affected by his/ her background. 
1980’s Onwards 
 The publication of the DSM-III in 1980 signaled the resurgence of the medical 
model based description of one’s distress. In a conference held in 1993, Judi Chamberlin 
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stated that the “Economic/ Social Model” most succinctly explained the distress she had 
experienced in 1966. Because the repressive 1950’s environment where “racism, 
classism, sexism, and heterosexism” enforced her and her colleagues to follow a path of 
conformity, she argued their emotional well-being was jeopardized. Recollecting over 
twenty years of experience as an ex-patient advocate for the alternative self-help system, 
she pointed out that a person could not help another human being unless he or she 
devoted themselves to listening to the other’s experience: “We cannot help a person 
unless we listen to his or her own perceptions of what is happening, and what things 
would be helpful (or unhelpful).” In contrast to this sharing, mutual experience, she 
explained how the medical model concept placed people’s distress out of context by 
sorting it into “little boxes called ‘symptoms.’”  In order to recover from such an 
inhumane process, Chamberlin argued that ex-patients needed to regain their voices by 
“recontexualizing” the memories and everyday experience that had once been 
“decontextualized” by the psychiatry system.286 
 Coinciding with the rise of anti-psychiatry and the psychiatric survivors 
movement, deinstitutionalization was one of the social transformations that changed 
American’s attitude towards the mentally ill. Starting from the mid 1950’s to the 1980’s, 
states dramatically reduced the numbers of state hospital patients. In 1955, more than 
550,000 patients were in state hospitals. By 1985, the number went down to 110,000; an 
eighty present drop in thirty years.287 During that time, the responsibility of the care of 
the mentally ill was shifting from state level to federal level. In 1956, an amendment of 
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the Social Security Act expanded the eligibility for the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) program. In 1972, the Social Security Act provided the Supplemental 
Security Income for the Aged, the Disabled, and the Blind (SSI) to the people who had 
not been eligible for the SSDI.288 Those entitlement programs encouraged moving state 
hospital patients to community based group homes.   
 However, the flow of subsidies to support deinstitutionalization abruptly halted 
with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981. To reduce taxes, Reagan carried out 
drastic budget cuts to federal domestic spending. Access to programs supporting 
independent living became more and more limited. For many long-term state hospital 
patients, being denied access to public housing meant homelessness because they had 
little skill to live outside of the hospital. The people with mental illness fared the worst in 
the SSDI cut.  When the Regan administration cut eleven percent of the total number of 
SSDI recipients, thirty percent of the people with mental disability were denied further 
assistance. 289    
 While contemporary scholars agree that the budget cut by Regan was the culprit 
in the increasing number of homeless with a history of mental illness, the opponents of 
anti-psychiatry and the psychiatric survivors movement in the 1980’s blamed the counter-
culture’s “rosy visions of fellowship and liberation that became prevalent in the sixties.” 
Their love of freedom consequently harvested the sense of distrust towards any 
institutional arrangements, they argued.290 A medical doctor Gerald Weissmann 
published an essay “Foucault and the Bag Lady” in 1982, blaming Foucault, Laing, and 
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Marcuse for bolstering the ongoing homelessness crisis and the brutal budget cut caused 
by their “therapeutic reforms of bourgeois liberalism.”291  
 In regard to deinstitutionalization, the patient advocates who were in favor of the 
medical model also criticized the proponents of the social model. A medical doctor E. 
Fuller Torrey stated that advocates like Judi Chamberlin encouraged patients to evade 
their responsibility towards the rest of the public for the sake of claiming their right to 
choice. At the Choice and Responsibility Symposium at Albany, New York in 1994, 
Torrey argued why we have an obligation not only to protect people with mental illness 
from the potential harm but also to protect the rest of public from the people who were in 
an active psychotic state: “For example,” Torrey continued “in a New York City study of 
individuals who push random people onto subway tracks in front of trains, it was reported 
19 out of 31 of the individuals doing the pushing were actively psychotic at the time.”292 
 In the symposium, Torrey further argued that the public should discuss the need to 
revive the asylum solution. Since deinstitutionalization began, Torrey cited, the rate of 
children whose mothers were “psychotic” had tripled. One third of those children were 
raised by their biological mothers. He further referred to a 1992 study by a New York 
psychiatric hospital that 3.4 percent of the patients admitted to the hospital were HIV 
positive. He implied those mothers were sexually promiscuous, irresponsible women who 
evaded the responsibility to rear their children in a traditional family setting for the sake 
of protecting their right to self-determination. Hence, he concluded, some ex-patients 
were better suited to return to “asylums which protect both the individual and the public.” 
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He concluded his speech: “Those who can think clearly have an obligation to do so when 
considering the needs of those who cannot think clearly. This is not paternalism. It is 
merely humane care.”293 
 To refute Torrey’s claim, Chamberlin argued how the discussion of the etiology 
of mental illness as something with a biological origin justified psychiatrists’ “power to 
lock people up and treat them against their will, or to overrule their personal life 
divisions.” By employing Szasz’s theory, Chamberlin stated that it was erroneous to 
deprive one’s liberty according to medical decisions; “These are legal, and ultimately 
moral decisions,” she concluded.294  Psychiatry had no right to force psychiatric 
interventions on potential patients because it was known that they were “vulnerable to 
‘mental illness.’” For Chamberlin, this paternalistic assumption justified involuntary 
commitment and coerced treatment because psychiatrists thought they held “the superior 
wisdom of those who have the power to make the definitions, and enforce the 
consequences” to others.295 
 After the 1980’s, activists in the psychiatric survivors movement began to lose 
hope of claiming their right to self-determination. Rae Unzicker, a South Dakota based 
mental health reformer felt “(t) he medical/ psychiatric/ disease/ social control model is 
deeply entrenched. All of medicine has become extremely technological at the expense, I 
believe, of human contact.”296 Because of the scientific nature of pharmacological 
intervention, Unzicker felt the function of diagnosis became more and more promoting 
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“the ‘us against them’ position,” justifying why people with mental illness needed 
chemical intervention so they could “join” the rest of the society.297 
 Chamberlin also felt discouraged during the 1980’s. The patients’ rights 
movement gained mainstream status, but it also meant many participants were not as 
passionate as Chamberlin and her colleagues.298 While she was speaking for the 1988 
Alternatives Conference in Utah, she was disappointed to realize that so many audiences 
were not sure why they were listening to her speech:  
There were all these people there who had literally been bused in from some 
program and who had no idea where they were, why they were there, and when 
they were going home. They were just sitting there smoking cigarettes. They 
weren’t going to meetings or anything. You know, they were going to meals and 
sitting outside smoking cigarettes wondering when the van was coming to take 
them home. I just thought that was the cruelest thing.299  
 
 From the 1980’s onwards, the psychiatric survivors movement began to 
transform. While some continued calling themselves survivors, some began to identify 
themselves as consumers of mental health services. The survivors like Ted Chabasinski 
felt now they were conducting advocacy work in order to gain funding from a 
governmental organization like the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). He felt 
that ex-patients’ primary goal was no longer voicing the oppression and assault they had 
experienced in psychiatric hospitals nor explaining the ignorance and indifference they 
received in their everyday lives.300  
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 Shortly after the Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990, Judi 
Chamberlin became actively involved with cross-disability advocacy work. By meeting a 
prominent disability rights activist Justin Dart, Chamberlin realized a great parallel 
between her advocacy work in the psychiatric survivors movement and his work in the 
disability rights movement. The disability rights advocators had been educating the 
public about how the concept of disability could be socially constructed. “The disability 
is not a medical condition. It’s not something wrong with you. It’s not something that 
resides in the individual. It’s society making assumptions about certain people based on 
characteristics. It’s just like racism,” Chamberlin explains in her 2002 interview with 
Derby Penney.301  
 In the later years of her career, she acknowledged the works of activists who 
believed mental illness was a brain disease. “I’m not going to kick them out,” she 
jokingly said. As long as they worked for “human rights for people labeled mentally ill,” 
she thought they were her allies. “We’re small enough as it is.”302  
 Her contribution to the 2000 federal report of the National Council of Disability, 
From Privileges to Rights was a major benchmark in cross-disability activism. She died 
in 2010 in Arlington, Massachusetts. Even while she was in a hospice, she kept updating 
a blog, Life as a Hospice Patient, to communicate with her readers. Her last entry was 
four days before she passed away.303 
 Still residing in Berkeley, Ted Chabasinski is active in the psychiatric survivors 
movement. He is now involved with the Justina Pelletier Case in Boston. In February 
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2013, parents in Connecticut lost custody of their teenage daughter on account of medical 
abuse. While Justina’s doctor at Tufts Medical Center diagnosed her with mitochondrial 
disease, a team at Boston Children’s Hospital diagnosed her with somatoform disorder 
caused by her parents’ psychological abuse. 304 Chabasinski closely relates Justina’s 
experience with his experience as a ward of the state, frequently traveling between both 
coasts to question the legitimacy of psychiatric authority as well as to meet young 
activists in Boston. He is currently writing an autobiography chronicling his life as a 
ward of the state, an activist, and an attorney.  
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Chapter 4 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that our pain, problems and the way we act are related to our lives in 
an often unjust society – men have power over women, whites over people of 
color, people are expected to fulfill unsatisfying roles, a few corporations (and the 
people who control them) are making a fortune, while many of us are unemployed, 
poor, can’t get what we need or find we are just unrespected cogs in a wheel 
(working for purposes we don’t believe in) at our work. Psychiatry does nothing 
to change these people-destroying situations. In fact it supports these situations by 
trying to convince us all people’s problems are personal and profiting by our pain. 
 
--Mental Patients Liberation Front305 
  
 I chronicled the early years of the psychiatric survivors movement by focusing on 
the life of Judi Chamberlin and her colleagues in order to show how ex-patients saw 
reclaiming the ownership and validity of their voice as the fundamental reason for 
organizing themselves for collective action. Because the psychiatric profession and the 
larger society systematically discredited the voices of those survivors, countless abuses of 
power were allowed to happen in asylums. Psychiatric survivors saw the façade of the 
asylum as the visual symbol of their oppression. In the early years of the psychiatric 
survivors movement, the psychiatric system used to be readily identified by the walls of 
an asylum. However, in last few decades state hospitals have undergone 
deinstitutionalization and many have been left abandoned, demolished, or converted into 
for-profit developments. The grand asylum on top of the hill on the outskirts of the town 
proper became an image from the past. On the other hand, the core of the system that was 
rooted in these old buildings has not gone away. Patients may no longer be confined to 
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the walls of an old asylum, but they are still not liberated in the sense that Chamberlin 
and her colleagues envisioned. The old system of custodial care has transformed into a 
more abstract, insidious form where the patients’ medical histories are collected and 
maintained electronically. The community based care model has proven insufficient to 
prepare for the long term custodial population many of whom ended up becoming 
homeless or incarcerated.306  
 Meanwhile a diagnosis still dictates the person’s identity within the current 
system, and this is true more than ever in the era of the DSM-5. A patient’s voice is still 
dictated by the diagnosis of psychiatrists who rely on labels obtained from the DSM in 
order to prescribe medication; bereavement has now been included as a Major Depressive 
Disorder in the DSM-5.307 Between 1996 and 2001, primary care physicians dispensed 
eighty percent of the entire anti-anxiety drug prescription, sixty-five present of anti-
depressants, and twenty percent of antipsychotics in the United States. 308 While the 
availability of medication has become easier, patients’ agency in determining the nature 
of their own treatment is more and more contested. Contemporary psychotherapy focuses 
on short-term treatments, suggesting that more structured forms of therapy have been 
deemed more effective only because they fit into the limited time frame available from 
clients’ insurance plans.309  
  In looking back the anti-psychiatry movement, Staub explains how Laing’s 
argument that people experienced psychosis because of the incessant pressures to adjust 
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to the unjust society has been “frequently dismissed and denounced as a sure sign of the 
counterculture’s loopy excesses.”310 The derogatory remarks made by Harvard 
psychiatrist Allan Hobson and medical journalist Jonathan Leonard depicting Laing and 
Szasz as members of the “lunatic fringe,” as well as Goffman as a figure who worsened 
the already negative image of mental hospitals are still largely unchallenged.311 
 Unlike the anti-psychiatry movement which saw society as the cause of mental 
illness, the DSM provided a systematic, objective diagnostic criteria. The arrival of the 
DSM-III in 1980 further propelled the notion, deeming the source of mental illness as 
one’s biochemical irregularity.312 However, Staub also looks at the resurgence of the 
“social diagnosis” of madness. New research shows the relationship between childhood 
trauma/ stress and the onset of schizophrenia, relooking at how environmental factors 
affect one’s mental health as much as one’s DNA sequence.313 
 A new study by Martin Harrow and Thomas Jobe published in 2013 questioned 
the efficacy of the long-term administration of antipsychotics.314 After a longitudinal 
study spanning twenty years, Harrow and Jobe concluded that schizophrenia patients who 
discontinued antipsychotics experienced more relapse in the first six to ten month, but 
they had a better outcome in the long run. They questioned the long-term (ten or more 
years) administration of antipsychotics because the patients with a long-term history of 
taking dopamine blocking agents likely develop “a dopamine supersensitivity”; they 
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would more likely experience psychotic episodes even while they are medicated.315 
Antipsychotics have been the basis of the treatment of schizophrenia, but as the study 
shows, some patients and mental health professionals are beginning to pronounce that 
medication is not the only way to treat or manage schizophrenia. The Hearing Voice 
Movement is one of those new developments that proposes an alternative to the 
conventional treatment.  
 Although there are fewer asylum walls today, patients are even less in control of 
their voices than ever before. Gaining control over one’s own voice and sharing that 
voice are vital because the discrediting of one’s experience and reducing it to a diagnostic 
category is an alienating process that devalues the uniqueness of one’s emotions. In a 
country where thirty to forty percent of the population is, or will be suffering from some 
forms of mental illness in their life time, the questions concerning the self-determination 
asked by Judi Chamberlin and her colleagues of the psychiatric survivors movement are 
still relevant today.316  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
315
 Robert Whitaker, “New Antipsychotics 2013 | Schizophrenia | Harrow and Jobe,” Mad in America, 
March 26, 2013, http://www.madinamerica.com/2013/03/do-antipsychotics-worsen-long-term-
schizophrenia-outcomes-martin-harrow-explores-the-question/. 
316
 Hirshbein, American Melancholy: Construction of Depression in the Twentieth Century., 5. 
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